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INTRODUCTION 
 
“The man who acts according to the rules of perfect prudence, of strict justice, of proper 
benevolence, may be said to be perfectly virtuous. But the most perfect knowledge of those 
rules will not alone enable him to act in this manner; his own passions are very apt to mislead 
him – sometimes to drive him, and sometimes to seduce him, to violate all the rules which he 
himself, in all his sober and cool hours, approves of.” 
     A d a m   S m i t h ,   Theory of Moral Sentiments 
 
People will only be perfectly virtuous if they do not allow their passions to 
mislead them. According to Smith (1892/1759), it takes more than perfect knowledge 
of all kinds of rules to adhere to them. What was he referring to? Individual freedom, 
according to Smith (1892/1759), is rooted in self-reliance, the ability of an individual 
to pursue his self-interest while commanding himself based on the principles of 
natural law. Without doubt, he was referring to what is currently better known as self-
control.  
The capacity to exert self-control is an important feature of human nature.  
Self-control refers to the self’s capability to alter its own responses.  In general, 
people are able to regulate their thoughts, control their emotions, alter their 
performance, or inhibit their impulses (e.g., Vohs & Baumeister, 2004b), and thus free 
themselves from control by the direct stimulus environment. Given the adaptive 
benefits of being able to control inner states and behavioral responses, self-control is 
of significant importance for achieving success in life (cf. Baumeister & Heatherton, 
1996). 
Self-control theories have focused on various aspects of the processes 
involved in exerting self-control. For instance, scholars have pointed out that people   2  
balance ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ cognitions (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), short-term and long-
term considerations (Wertenbroch, 1998), low-level and high-level construals (Fujita, 
Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, in press), visceral responses and rational self-interest 
(Loewenstein, 1996), or desire and willpower (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991) in 
exerting self-control. Others have stressed the distinction between automatic and 
controlled psychological processes in exerting self-control (Bargh & Chartrand, 
1999), the role of perceptions of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1991), and cybernetic 
feedback principles (Carver & Scheier, 1981), and the energetic nature of self-control 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998).  
This last theory, the theory of self-control depletion, has received a lot of 
attention lately. It states that all acts of self-control draw on a common limited 
resource that is akin to energy or strength. Hence, exertion of self-control is 
necessarily followed by a period of diminished capacity to exert subsequent self-
control. Eventually, with sufficient rest, the resource should build up again (e.g., 
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Studies on self-control depletion typically use a two-
task paradigm. Participants are asked to exert self-control and then perform a 
subsequent, seemingly unrelated task that also requires self-control. In general, it is 
found that the first self-control task reduces performance on the second self-control 
task (see Vohs & Baumeister, 2004a, for a review). Researchers have demonstrated 
self-control depletion in various circumstances. Behaviors as diverse as thought 
suppression (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998), persistence at strenuous tasks 
(Baumeister et al., 1998), emotion control (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), response 
inhibition (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002), intellectual performance (Schmeichel, 
Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003), self-presentation (Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005),   3  
and attention regulation (Vohs & Faber, in press) have been shown to rely on the 
scarce self-control resource. 
We focus on the theory of self-control depletion throughout this dissertation. 
We will follow two related routes of research. A first contribution of this dissertation 
is to explore some important consequences of self-control depletion for consumer 
decision making behavior. A second contribution is to provide more insight in the 
process involved in exerting self-control and the factors that lead to self-control 
depletion. 
 
Self-control depletion and consumer behavior 
 
The prevailing paradigm to describe consumer behavior in marketing has long 
been the rational choice model. Consumers were assumed to be rational decision 
makers who implemented carefully evaluated decision alternatives (e.g., Bettman, 
1979). However, this stance has proven to be incomplete accurate sometimes. There 
are episodes during which consumers act against their better judgment, engaging in 
behavior that is often regretted after the fact, and that would have been rejected with 
sufficient consideration. It appears that consumers are driven both by long-term 
rational concerns and short-term emotional factors (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). 
Hence, the notion of self-control, defined as efforts to avoid behaving in a short-
sighted emotion-driven fashion, should be incorporated into the traditional decision-
analytic accounts of human behavior (e.g., Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; Loewenstein, 
1996, 2000). 
Baumeister (2002) outlined the applicability of self-control processes, and 
more specifically, of the theory of self-control depletion, to consumer behavior.   4  
Causes of self-control failure might be important for understanding several aspects of 
consumer behavior. Effective self-control has been argued to depend on the 
acquisition of unambiguous standards, a successful monitoring process, and the 
capacity to alter one’s behavior (e.g., Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). First, 
consumers who do not know what they want (i.e., who have ambiguous standards) 
will be relatively susceptible to external influences such as sales persons and 
advertisements. Second, consumers who are not successful in keeping track of 
relevant behaviors such as the amount of money they spend (i.e., who are 
unsuccessful in monitoring their behavior), will be relatively susceptible to 
overspending. Finally, consumers who do have unambiguous standards and are 
successful in monitoring their behavior may still fail at self-control whenever they 
lack the capacity to make themselves perform the necessary actions. Exerting self-
control may influence this capacity through the depletion of self-control resources. 
Consumers in a state of depletion should be less likely to perform the necessary 
actions and, for instance, be more likely to spend money or to consume vice products 
(Baumeister, 2002).  
Empirically, depletion has been linked to consumer choices that are not 
conducive to long-term self-interest, such as impulsive spending (Vohs & Faber, in 
press). Resisting temptation has also been found to rely on the scarce self-control 
resource (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), implying that consumers in a state of depletion 
will be more likely to yield to temptation. Vohs et al. (2004) observed that one of the 
most frequent activities during a shopping trip – that is, active choice-making - 
depletes self-control resources.  
The first contribution of the present dissertation consists of adding to this 
literature. In Manuscript I, we replicate that choosing relies on the scarce self-control   5  
resource, and show that depletion enhances consumers’ susceptibility to purchasing 
products on the basis of affective product features, such as taste. In Manuscript II, we 
provide real-life evidence for a link between depletion and consumer behavior. More 
specifically, we observe that reduced exposure to sunshine is related to increased 
lottery expenditures. We show that a shortage of sunshine induces consumers who 
suffer from weather-induced bad moods to engage in active mood regulation attempts 
that are depleting in nature, resulting in a decreased resistance of lottery play.  
 
Processes involved in exerting self-control 
 
Although the self-control as energy analogy seems powerful and appealing, 
recent literature has pointed out the importance of broadening our perspective on self-
control and of investigating the exact nature of the scarce self-control resource (e.g., 
Vohs & Baumeister, 2004a). A start in tackling this question has been made by 
linking self-control resources to other self-related phenomena.  
Muraven, Baumeister, and Tice (1999) found that people showed improved 
self-control performance after a two-week self-control training period as compared to 
a control group. Martijn, Tenbült, Merckelbach, Dreezens, and de Vries (2002) 
showed that self-control performance can be guided by people thinking that the scarce 
self-control resource exists, suggesting that self-control might not be a matter of 
energy alone, but also of implicit theories and expectancies about self-control. 
Muraven and Slessareva (2003) advanced a similar view by suggesting that people act 
as if self-control is a limited resource. They showed that the traditional depletion 
effect is moderated by motivation. Vohs and Schmeichel (2003) observed that people 
experience time as moving more slowly during and after they have exerted self-  6  
control, and found that this distorted experience statistically mediated the traditional 
depletion effect. Depleted people seem to be transfixed in the present, rendering them 
more susceptible to immediate stimuli, impulses, desires, and thus, a loss of self-
control. Vohs and Schmeichel (2003) labeled this experience ‘the extended-now 
state’. 
Although the aforementioned studies provide insight in several important 
moderators of the depletion effect, the exact nature of the scarce self-control resource 
remains hard to pin down to this day. Manuscript III intends to add to our 
understanding of the processes involved in self-control by demonstrating that exerting 
self-control leads one to narrowly direct one’s attention towards concrete task 
characteristics. This possibly results in enhanced performance on the self-control task 
at hand but reduced performance on other tasks.   
   7  
MANUSCRIPT I 
 
REPEATED CHOOSING INCREASES SUSCEPTIBILITY TO AFFECTIVE 







The present research demonstrates that repeated active choice-making 
increases consumers’ susceptibility to salient affective product features. We show that 
affective features influence product choice more after a series of active product 
choices than after a series of compliances with purchase instructions.  The combined 
results of three experiments suggest that repeated choice depletes self-control resource 
strength, in that repeated choosing renders consumers vulnerable to the temptation of 
emotionally-laden product features.  
   8  
Imagine that you have promised your significant other that you would do 
today’s shopping.  Inside the store, you have a hard time choosing the best color for a 
new coffee mug.  Should it be blue or should it be yellow? You also have difficulties 
deciding between one of two familiar-looking brands of laundry detergent because 
your shopping list does not specify which brand to buy.  To complicate matters even 
more, you find it taxing to determine how many apples to purchase, because your 
shopping list does not say how many you need.  You struggle through the rest of the 
list choosing and selecting items as well as you can.  Then you see the freezer full of 
ice cream.  Ice cream is the last item on your shopping list.  There is a less expensive, 
less attractive brand of ice cream but also a more expensive and more delicious brand.  
You remember that you are on a limited budget but in the end you cannot resist the 
temptation.  You buy the more expensive, more delicious ice cream.  We propose that 
you may not have succumbed to the delicious-looking (and more expensive) ice 
cream if you had not previously made choices among coffee mug colors, laundry 
detergents, or calculated how many apples to buy.  Specifically, we submit that the 
ability to stick to a fixed budget is impaired by previous episodes of choice-making.  
In this paper we present three studies to support this claim.     
Several decades ago, researchers began to recognize that consumer purchase 
decisions are driven by more than the tangible product or service being offered for 
sale.  Indeed, the tangible product is but a small part of the total product.  In addition 
to tangibles, the product includes pleasantries, images, packaging, advertising, and 
other product features, all of which are thought to receive considerable attention in 
consumer choice-making (Kotler, 1973).  Now researchers know that consumer 
purchase decisions are influenced by considerations of both affective and cognitive   9  
product features.
 1   Affective product features furnish fun, pleasure, fantasy and 
excitement.  In contrast, cognitive product features are primarily instrumental, 
functional and goal-oriented (Dhar & Wertenbroch, 2000).  When consumers give 
more weight to affective product features at the expense of cognitive product features, 
they may be prone to making suboptimal purchase decisions that will bring regret 
later (cf. impulsive spending; Rook, 1987; Rook & Fischer, 1995; Rook & Hoch, 
1985).  We argue that susceptibility to affective product features can be brought about 
by a lack of self-control strength.  In this paper, we argue that it requires self-control 
strength to give sufficient weight to cognitive product features and not to succumb to 
the enticement of affectively-laden product features.  Moreover, the current approach 
views engagement in a repeated choice-making process as one route by which self-
control strength is depleted.  Accordingly, an overvaluation of affective product 
features is thought to come about because of depleted self-control strength, a state that 
may well be a consequence of the shopping process itself. 
 
Previously studied determinants of susceptibility to affective product features  
 
It has been argued that consumers may overvalue affective product features at 
the expense of cognitive product features, depending on the environmental 
stimulation (for reviews see Bitner, 1992; Lam, 2001; Turley & Milliman, 2000) or 
the degree of novelty and complexity in the environment (Donovan & Rossiter, 1982; 
Mehrabian & Russell, 1974).  Examples of in-store atmospheric variables that impact 
the environmental load and thus consumer behavior are music, odor, colour, and 
                                                 
1 Affective and cognitive considerations have been referred to as desire and willpower (Hoch & 
Loewenstein, 1991), as vice and virtue considerations (Wertenbroch, 1998), as parts of the hot 
emotional and the cool cognitive system (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), or as hedonic and utilitarian 
considerations (Dhar & Wertenbroch, 2000).  For the sake of clarity, we will use the terms ‘affective’ 
and ‘cognitive’ throughout the remainder of the paper, following Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999).   10  
lighting (Turley & Milliman, 2000).  Research has shown that variations of 
atmospheric variables have an influence on the amount of money people spend, the 
number of items they purchase (Turley & Milliman, 2000), time spent in the store, 
and increased unplanned spending (Donovan, Rossiter, Marcoolyn, & Nesdale, 1994).  
Hence, there is evidence that in-store atmospherics – through the novelty or 
complexity of the stimulation in the store - can create shopping experiences that are 
both affect-enhancing and cognitively demanding.  As a result, shopping experiences 
can reduce consumers’ available cognitive resources and enhance consumers’ 
susceptibility to affective product features.   
Research on the effect of environmental load has focused only on the 
concurrent taxing of cognitive resources on consumers’ susceptibility to affective 
product features.  Building on the self-control literature however, we aimed to 
demonstrate that susceptibility to affective product features can also be a consequence 
of previous taxation of scarce self-resources.  Specifically, we focus on engagement in 
a series of product choices as a determinant of overvaluation of affective product 
features in a purchase situation.  We investigate consumer choice-making in the 
context of a realistic shopping situation.  We expect that consumers engaging in 
repeated choice-making will be susceptible to affective product features.   
Our rationale for this reasoning is twofold.  First, it can be inferred from 
theorizations as well as empirical findings that it requires self-control strength to give 
sufficient weight to cognitive product features. Hence, giving more weight to 
affective product features and less weight to cognitive product features suggests a lack 
of available self-control strength (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; Metcalfe & Mischel, 
1999; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999).  Second, research on repeated choice-making has 
demonstrated that it brings about a loss of self-control due to a depletion of self-  11  
regulatory resources (Vohs et al., 2004).  Hence, the present paper considers repeated 
choice-making (e.g., through the process of shopping) as a key factor determining 
subsequent susceptibility to affective product features.  Both lines of reasoning will be 
elaborated on in the next paragraphs. 
 
Lack of self-control resources and susceptibility to affective product features  
 
There are both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence to suggest that 
preferences for affective product features (relative to cognitive product features) 
imply low levels of self-control.  Theoretically, it can be inferred that consumers will 
prefer attractive products over functional products when they lack sufficient self-
control resources (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).   
Empirically, it was found that consumers with sufficient resources were better able to 
resist affective product features, whereas this was more difficult for consumers who 
lacked resources (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999).   
Hoch and Loewenstein’s (1991) theoretical framework of consumer purchases 
as a struggle between affective and cognitive considerations points to lowered self-
control as one primary reason.  According to this analysis, when affective 
considerations exceed cognitive considerations, consumer self-control breaks down. 
Metcalfe and Mischel (1999)  have argued that affective and cognitive 
representations can be conceptualized as two separate but interacting systems.   
Typically, responses that are determined by affective considerations are either 
approach or avoidance patterns.  In contrast, responses that are established by 
cognitive considerations consist of descriptions, statements, assertions, and 
commentaries (i.e., reflections).  According to Metcalfe and Mischel (1999), self-  12  
control ability is determined by the capacity to limit the dominance of affective 
considerations in the service of cognitive goal pursuit.  This is possible through 
engagement in cooling operations such as distraction, symbolic transformations of the 
affective stimulus, avoiding drift to affective considerations, and enriching cognitive 
considerations.  However, the extent of cognitive elaboration varies depending on 
several factors.   
Trade-offs between affective and cognitive considerations have received 
empirical attention (Babin & Darden, 1995; Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003; 
Read & van Leeuwen, 1998).  For instance, it has been shown that consumer choice 
between affective and cognitive product features depended on whether consumers had 
sufficient cognitive resources (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999).  Consumers who were 
under high cognitive load were significantly more influenced by affective product 
features than consumers who were under low cognitive load.  In other words, 
consumers with sufficient resources were better able to resist affective product 
features, whereas this was more difficult for consumers who lacked resources.   
Framed according to the self-regulatory resource model, this suggests that consumers 
will buy the affective product when they are depleted and therefore lack sufficient 
self-control resources.  In contrast, when consumers are not depleted and have 
sufficient self-control resources, they will be able to refrain from buying the affective 
product. 
In the present research, we show that susceptibility to affective products can 
be a consequence of previous taxation on scarce self-resources.  Specifically, we 
focus on repeated choice-making as a determinant of preference of affective products 
over cognitive products. 
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Active choice-making and self-control depletion 
      
The capacity to exert self-control is an important feature of human nature.  
Self-control refers to the self’s capacity to alter its own responses (e.g., to regulate 
one’s thoughts, control one’s emotions, alter one’s performance or inhibit one’s 
impulses; Vohs & Baumeister, 2004b).  It has been argued that all acts of self-control 
draw on a common limited resource that is akin to energy or strength.  Hence, 
exertion of self-control is necessarily followed by a period of diminished capacity to 
exert subsequent self-control.  Eventually, with sufficient rest, the resource should 
build up again (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice, & 
Baumeister, 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000; Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005).   
Studies on self-control depletion typically use a two-task paradigm.   
Participants are asked to exert self-control and then perform a subsequent, seemingly 
unrelated task that also requires self-control.  In over 40 published experiments (see 
Vohs & Baumeister, 2004a, for a review), it has been found that the first self-control 
task reduces performance on the second self-control task.  Researchers have attempted 
to demonstrate self-control depletion in diverse circumstances.  For instance, 
controlling one’s emotions or suppressing forbidden thoughts induced people soon 
afterwards to show impaired physical stamina or to give up quickly on unsolvable 
anagrams (Muraven et al., 1998).  Likewise, resisting tempting chocolates or 
suppressing one’s emotions caused people soon afterwards to quit faster on 
unsolvable puzzles or to show impaired performance on solvable anagrams 
(Baumeister et al., 1998).  Resisting good-tasting snacks or controlling one’s 
emotional expressions made dieters eat more ice cream in the next task (Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2000).    14  
There exists evidence that choosing requires self-control and therefore 
depletes regulatory resources.  Baumeister et al. (1998) found that making a 
meaningful personal choice (i.e., deciding whether or not to make a counter-
attitudinal speech) caused people to quit faster on unsolvable puzzles than people who 
did not have to make this choice beforehand.  A more extensive test was conducted by 
Vohs et al. (2004), who asked some participants to make a series of choices among 
household products or to choose about features of a product class (i.e., choice 
participants), whereas other participants evaluated the same products and product 
features but did not make any choices (i.e., these were no-choice participants).   
Subsequently, choice participants were found to drink less of a bad-tasting beverage 
(Study 1 and Study 2),  persist less on a cold water pressure task (i.e., keeping one’s 
hand in water of 1°C; Study 3), and  perform worse on a math task (Study 4) than no-
choice participants.  In Study 5 (Vohs et al., 2004) people were approached at a 
shopping mall and asked to complete a choice questionnaire.  Subsequently, all 
respondents were asked to solve 100 addition problems.  As predicted from the 
choice-depletion hypothesis, people who had made a lot of difficult choices during 
their shopping trip performed poorly on the addition problems.  Vohs et al. (2004) 
concluded that across a wide variety of circumstances, active choice-making depletes 
self-control resources.  These findings are in line with earlier accounts that stressed 
active guidance by the self as a requirement for all kinds of complex forms of 
information processing, including active choice-making (Schmeichel, Vohs, & 
Baumeister, 2003).  
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The current studies 
 
Susceptibility to affective product features might be affected by the shopping 
process itself. This reasoning assumes two steps. First, resistance to exaggerated 
influence of affective product features requires self-control.  Therefore, self-control 
depletion is likely to make consumers more susceptible to affective product features.  
Second, Baumeister (2002) suggested that shopping may tax consumers’ resources, in 
part because it involves a series of active choices.  If this is true, at the conclusion of a 
shopping trip consumers should be rather susceptible to affective product features at 
the cost of cognitive product features.  In the present research, we tested the 
hypothesis that making a series of product choices would heighten consumers’ 
susceptibility to affective product features.   
In three studies, we assessed susceptibility to affective product features after 
engaging in depleting versus non-depleting choice tasks.  In Study 1, participants 
were either asked to make a series of six binary product choices (i.e., depleting choice 
task), or were instructed to select the same product as the participant before them had 
done (i.e., non-depleting choice task).  Afterwards, participants were given the 
opportunity to choose between an attractive but expensive product and a cheaper but 
less attractive product of similar functionality. If depletion through active choice-
making increases the weight of affective product features at the expense of the weight 
of cognitive product features, depleted participants would be expected to select the 
more attractive (but expensive) product more often than non-depleted participants, a 
prediction that received support in Study 1.  In Studies 2 and 3, participants either 
were given the option of choosing as many single pieces of candy as they wanted 
from each of six different flavors of candy (i.e., depleting choice task), or were   16  
instructed to select the same number of items of those six types of candy as the 
participant before them had done (i.e., non-depleting choice task).  In Study 2, the 
dependent measure of consumption was purchase amount of a very attractive but 
overpriced type of candy, whereas in Study 3 the consumption measure was purchase 
amount of a very attractive but overpriced type of candy versus a less attractive but a 
cheaper type of candy.  Again, if depletion as a result of active choice-making 
increases the weight of affective product features at the expense of the weight of 
cognitive product features, depleted participants would be expected to buy more items 
of the attractive but overpriced candy than non-depleted participants.  We found 
support for this claim in Studies 2 and 3.  
 
Study 1  
 
In previous research, it has been shown that making a series of choices leads to 
self-control depletion (Vohs et al., 2004).  We built on these studies to test the 
hypothesis that self-control depletion through active choice-making increases 
subsequent susceptibility to affective product features.  In the choice condition, 
participants were asked to make six binary product choices.  For five of these six 
product pairs, the two products were equally attractive and equivalently priced.   
Accordingly, choosing between those products was expected to be difficult and hence, 
depleting.  In the no-choice condition, participants’ choices were yoked to the choice 
condition participant before them, such that participants were instructed to select the 
same products as the choice condition participant before them had done.  Hence, no-
choice participants did not have to ponder over options and consequently their task 
was considered to be non-depleting.  Subsequently, all participants in both conditions   17  
made one binary product choice as the measure of importance of cognitive versus 
affective product features.  Within this product pair, one product was more attractive 
but more expensive than the other product.  Given similar functionality, attractiveness 
was considered to be a relatively affective product feature, whereas price was 
considered to be a relatively cognitive product feature.  It was hypothesized that 
choice participants (i.e., participants in the choice condition) would be relatively more 
influenced by the affective (i.e., attractiveness) rather than the cognitive (i.e., price) 
feature than no-choice participants (i.e., participants in the no-choice condition).   
 
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 101 undergraduate students.  Data from 12 
participants were discarded because they did not comply with the instructions by not 
buying the products in the assigned order.  Of the remaining 89 participants, 62 were 
women.  Ages ranged from 18 to 31 years (M = 21.42 years, SD = 2.20 years).   
Participants were rewarded with money and with a gift for their cooperation.  The 
money and the gift had a combined value of € 7.50.   
Materials. A store was simulated in the laboratory.  Eleven product categories 
were displayed on a table.  Seven of these product categories were on the shopping 
list that participants received upon entering the shop.  The remaining four product 
categories served as fillers.
2  Each product category consisted of two products.   
Results of a pretest conducted in the same population (n = 42) showed that both 
products in each pair were equally attractive for the five product categories of interest.  
Those products all received the same price label, € 1, which was close to their retail 
price.  As a result, choosing between the two products within each of these five 
                                                 
2 The seven product categories on participants’ shopping lists were light bulbs, coasters, candles, 
drinking straws, Christmas cards, chocolates and staples.  The four filler product categories were 
drinking glasses, cactuses, alarm clocks and pens.   18  
product categories was expected to be difficult and hence, depleting.  A second 
independent pretest also in the same population (n = 42) showed that the prices that 
participants believed the two products in each of these five pairs would have in the 
store did not differ.  
The two pretests also showed that for two product categories of interest, the 
two options differed in attractiveness and expected price.  Those two remaining 
product categories served as our target product categories.  We selected two product 
categories as a first step towards generalizability.  In both categories, we created a 
conflict between the affective and the cognitive aspects.  The affective aspect was 
attractiveness.  The cognitive aspect was price.  One product category was staples, 
which were either multi-colored or ordinary gray staples.  Because colored staples 
were regarded as more attractive than regular gray staples, we priced the colored 
staples at € 1.20 and the gray staples at € 0.90.  A second product category was 
chocolates.  Santa Claus-shaped chocolates were regarded as more attractive than elf-
shaped chocolates.  The Santa Claus-shaped chocolates were priced at € 1 and the elf-
shaped chocolates at € 0.90.  In both cases, prices were selected such that the price 
difference between the products in each target product category was larger than the 
price difference participants would probably expect (i.e., a price difference based on 
the results of the pretest).  Order of chocolate versus staple category was 
counterbalanced. Half of the participants saw the chocolate-shape product category on 
their shopping list first and the staples last, whereas the order was reversed for the 
other half of participants.  For convenience, we refer to the attractive but expensive   19  
product as the affective product and to the cheap but less attractive product as the 
cognitive product.
3      
Procedure.  The present experiment was the first in a series of unrelated 
studies.  Participants were scheduled to come to the laboratory individually.  Upon 
arrival, they were asked to watch a five-minute computer presentation with landscape 
pictures and peaceful music.  The aim of this presentation was to reduce differences 
that may have existed in pre-experimental levels of self-control depletion.  A pretest 
(n = 77) indeed showed that this presentation reduces feelings of stress and increases 
reports of calm.  
After the presentation, participants were invited to visit a simulated store.   
They received a shopping basket and were told to pick seven products from a 
shopping list.  Participants received € 7.50 and were told that, at the end of the 
experiment, they would have to actually buy one of the products they had picked.  
This product would be randomly determined by means of a lottery.  This procedure is 
incentive compatible (e.g., Wertenbroch, 1998).  It was made clear that if a more 
expensive product was purchased at the end of the experiment, consequently less 
money would be left of the € 7.50 to take home.  Hence, this incentive compatible 
procedure does not necessarily bias participants towards choosing affective products.   
At this point, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: a 
choice or a no-choice condition.  Participants in both conditions received a shopping 
list.  In the choice condition, the shopping list consisted of seven product category 
names.  For each of these seven product categories, participants had to decide which 
of the two options to select.  In the no-choice condition, the shopping list contained 
the names of six products instead of product categories. Only for the last product 
                                                 
3 There were no visible brand names on the products.  Therefore, participants could not choose 
products based on familiarity with a particular brand.   20  
category, which represented the dependent measure, did participants have to make a 
decision between two options.  To increase comparability between the two conditions, 
no-choice participants were yoked to the choice participants with respect to the 
product choices.  Hence, in terms of an account of actual selections, the no-choice and 
choice conditions had identical selections for all products until choice number six.  
The major difference was that the no-choice condition involved no active choice-
making regarding the first six products on the shopping list.  In both conditions, the 
time required to pick up every single product and to put it in the shopping basket was 
registered. 
Subsequently, by means of a lottery game, it was determined which product 
participants had to buy with part of their € 7.50.  At the end of the experiment, 
participants were debriefed and thanked. 
To ensure that mood did not differ as a function of having or not having to 
make choices, a pretest (n = 36) was conducted. The results showed that the choice 
manipulation did not induce significant differences in positive (F(1, 34) = 0.18, p = 
.67) or negative affect (F(1, 34) = 0.05, p = .83) as measured by the Positive Affect 
Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).   
 
Results and discussion 
We predicted that participants in the choice condition would show more 
susceptibility to affective product features than participants in the no-choice condition 
and thus purchase the affective product more often than the cognitive product.  To test 
this hypothesis, we conducted a logistic regression analysis with choice (no choice 
versus free choice) as the predictor variable, shopping time as a covariate, and product 
choice as the dependent variable.  This analysis indicated that choice participants   21  
chose the affective product significantly more often (53.5%) than no-choice 
participants (37.0%), Wald χ² (Df = 1) = 6.50, p < .05.   
Shopping time was inserted as a covariate because preliminary analyses 
revealed significant differences in shopping times between the choice and the no-
choice condition, F (1, 83) = 20.84, p < .0001.  Average shopping times were 
significantly lower for no-choice participants (M = 50.98 s, SD = 18.66 s) than for 
choice participants (M = 71.56 s, SD = 22.82 s).  Preliminary analyses showed no 
effects of gender or product replicate on the dependent measure of product choice.  
Therefore, these variables were omitted from the analyses.  
Study 1 tested the idea that consumer choice changes attraction to affective 
and cognitive aspects of products.  We found that after a series of active product 
choices, affective product features were chosen more often as compared to products 
purchased after a similar task but which did not involve choosing. 
Even with these encouraging results, two alternative explanations are possible.  
First, choice participants needed more time to complete the shopping task than no-
choice participants.  The choice condition may have led to a more real-life shopping 
experience than the no-choice condition, and hence may have increased the personal 
relevance of the last product choice.  Because of increasing relevance, the 
attractiveness might have received more attention, and hence affected choice more in 
the choice condition than in the no-choice condition.  However, time spent shopping 
was statistically controlled for, which mitigates this possible explanation.  A second 
alternative explanation involves the idea that the percentage of affective choices in the 
experimental condition is a random choice process, given that the percentage of 
affective choices was 53.5%, which is statistically equivalent to 50%.  Studies 2 and 3   22  





Study 2 was a conceptual replication of Study 1 that additionally corrected the 
time confound of Study 1 by altering the demands of the shopping task to require 
equal amounts of time shopping.   
As in Study 1, we used making product choices as a manipulation of self-
control depletion.  In the choice condition, participants were asked to choose as many 
single pieces of candy as they wanted from each of six different flavors of candy.  In 
the no-choice condition, participants were instructed to select the same number of 
items of those six types of candy as the participant in the choice condition before 
them had done.  Subsequently, participants in both conditions were given the 
opportunity to buy as much candy as they wanted of a highly appealing type of candy.   
The price of the candy was set as much higher than its retail price, and thus the price 
(which was a cognitive feature) was a negative feature. However, because the candy 
was very appealing, its expected taste (i.e., an affective feature) was a rather positive 
feature.  In line with our hypothesis and the findings of Study 1, we expected that 
choice participants would be more affected by the affective product feature relative to 
the cognitive product feature, and hence they would purchase more of the attractive 
candy than no-choice participants.   
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Method 
Participants. Participants were 47 undergraduate students.  Data from three 
participants were discarded because they did not comply with the instructions by not 
buying the products in the assigned order.  Of the remaining 44 participants, there 
were 14 men and 30 women.  Their age ranged from 19 to 25 years (M = 21.45 years, 
SD = 1.42 years).  All students participated in order to receive partial course credit.  
They were also rewarded with money and with a gift.  The money and the gift had a 
combined value of € 2.   
Materials. A store was simulated in the laboratory.  Seven bowls filled with 
approximately 200 grams of candy were displayed on two tables.  All seven types of 
candy in the bowls were on the shopping list that participants received.  Results of a 
pretest conducted in the same population (n = 32) showed that the attractiveness of six 
types of candy was equivalent and high.  In close accordance with actual prices, three 
types of candy received a price label of € 0.60 per 100 grams and the other three types 
of candy received a price label of € 0.80 per 100 grams.  The pretest also showed that 
one type of candy (i.e., wrapped mini-chocolates) was more attractive than the other 
types of candy.  This type of candy served as our target candy and therefore was last 
on participants’ shopping list.  We priced this attractive type of candy at € 1 per 100 
grams, which is more expensive than the retail price, which was € 0.77 per 100 grams.  
The quantity of mini-chocolates (i.e., most expensive candy) purchased was our 
measure of susceptibility to affective product features, relative to cognitive features.  
Procedure. The procedure of Study 2 was identical to the one of Study 1, with 
a few exceptions.  In the simulated store, participants were told to put the different 
types of candy from a shopping list in seven little paper bags.  As all participants 
manually scooped the different pieces of candy in the seven bags, shopping time was   24  
expected to be equal in both conditions.  In both conditions, the time required to put 
every type of candy in the little paper bag and to put the bag in the shopping basket 
was recorded.  Participants received € 2 and were told that they would have to buy 
one of the amounts of candy they selected at the end of the experiment.  The bag of 
candy to be purchased would be randomly determined by the experimenter by means 
of a lottery and thus participants were reminded that no single bag of candy could cost 
more than € 2. 
At this point, participants were again randomly assigned to one of two yoked 
conditions: a choice or a no-choice condition.  In the choice condition, the shopping 
list consisted of seven candy names.  Participants were asked to choose as many 
single pieces of candy as they wanted from each of seven different flavors of candy.  
In the no-choice condition, the shopping list contained the names and the desired 
number of the first six candy items and the name of the highly appealing type of 
candy (e.g., “mini-Twix: Take four of them”).  Participants were given the 
opportunity to buy as much candy as they wanted only for the highly appealing type 
of candy.  While participants in both conditions were shopping, the experimenter was 
eating the very attractive target type of candy to make this target type of candy even 
more attractive.  
 
Results and discussion 
Again we predicted that participants in the choice condition would show a 
higher susceptibility to affective product features than participants in the no-choice 
condition and thus purchase more of the highly appealing type of candy than no-
choice participants.  We conducted a one-way ANOVA using choice (no choice 
versus free choice) as predictors of amount of the mini-chocolate candy.  The results   25  
indicated that choice participants purchased significantly more of the candy (M = 
47.18 grams, SD = 35.27 grams) than did no-choice participants (M = 29.51 grams, 
SD = 17.33 grams), F (1, 42) = 4.45, p < .05.
4   
Preliminary analyses did not reveal any gender effects.  Therefore, this 
variable was omitted from the analyses.  This time, preliminary analyses also failed to 
reveal significant differences in shopping times between the choice and the no-choice 
condition, F (1, 42) = 0.22, p = .64.  Hence, we were successful in equating shopping 
times in both conditions and thus this variable was also omitted from the analyses.   
The results of Study 2 support the view that choosing reduces consumers’ 
resistance to affective product features.  As in Study 1, we found that susceptibility to 
affective product features was higher after a series of active product choices than after 
a similar task that did not require choice-making.  Note that in Study 2, the choice 
manipulation was not confounded with time; therefore, the alternative explanation 
that shopping time differences accounted for the effect is mitigated.  The aim of Study 
3, then, was to directly address the other alternative explanation that choice 




As in Studies 1 and 2, we used making product choices as a manipulation of 
self-control depletion.  Participants either chose as many single pieces of candy as 
they wanted from each of six different flavors of candy (i.e., the choice condition) or 
selected the same number of items of those six types of candy as the participants in 
the choice condition to whom they were yoked (i.e., the no-choice condition).  
                                                 
4 As the variance was significantly different in both conditions, we also conducted a non-parametric 
analysis.  A Mann-Whitney U test yielded similar results, Z = 2.05, p < .05.   
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Subsequently, participants in both conditions were given the opportunity to buy as 
much candy as they wanted of a highly appealing but overpriced type of candy and a 
less appealing but cheaper type of candy.  Again, the series of preceding choices in 
the choice condition should deplete participants and should increase the relative 
importance of the affective product feature (i.e., taste) and decrease the relative 
importance of the cognitive product feature (i.e., price) relative to the no-choice 
condition.  Because the affective product feature is weaker for the less attractive type 
of candy, we expected that in comparison with no-choice participants, choice 
participants would buy more of the very attractive candy (i.e., greater influence of 
affective product features) but not of the less attractive candy.  The random 
explanation, in contrast, predicts that choice of the two types of candy should become 
less distinguishable (i.e., closer to a 50/50 distribution) in the choice condition than in 
the no-choice condition.  
 
Method 
Participants.  Participants were 42 undergraduate students (30 men and 12 
women).  Their age ranged from 19 to 24 years (M = 20.98 years, SD = 1.44 years).  
All students participated in order to receive partial course credit.  They were also 
rewarded with money and with a gift.  The money and the gift had a combined value 
of € 2.   
Materials. A store was simulated in the laboratory.  Four pairs of bowls filled 
with approximately 200 grams of candy were displayed on two tables.  All eight types 
of candy in the bowls were on the shopping list that participants received upon 
entering the shop.  Results of a pretest (n = 32) showed that seven types of candy 
were equally attractive.  In close accordance with actual prices, the first pair of bowls   27  
of candy received a price label of € 0.60 per 100 grams, the second pair of bowls of 
candy received a price label of € 0.70 per 100 grams, and the third pair of bowls of 
candy received a price label of € 0.80 per 100 grams.  The last pair of candy bowls 
once again contained the highly appealing mini-chocolates and one of the relatively 
less attractive types of candy (i.e., M&M’s without peanuts).  These types of candy 
came last and second-last on participants’ shopping list, respectively.  In the pretest 
(n=32), 75 % preferred the mini-chocolates to the M&M’s (Z = 2.83, p < .01).  The 
less attractive type of candy received a price label of € 0.80 per 100 grams and the 
very attractive type of candy received a price label of € 1 per 100 grams.  The quantity 
of mini-chocolates purchased (which was the most expensive candy) relative to the 
quantity of M&M’s purchased (which was the less expensive candy) was the 
dependent measure of susceptibility to affective product features.  
Procedure. The procedure of Study 3 was identical to the one of Study 2, with 
a few exceptions.  In the simulated store participants were instructed to put the candy 
of the two bowls that were placed together in the same little paper bag.  This was done 
to rule out the random choice hypothesis.  Indeed, in order to rule out this alternative 
hypothesis, all participants had to make a double product choice at the conclusion of 
their shopping trip.  If depleted participants would choose randomly, we would expect 
them to select an equal amount of both types of candy.  In contrast, if depleted 
participants would choose on the basis of affective features, we would expect them to 
select more of the very attractive type of candy (mini-chocolates) than of the less 
attractive type of candy (M&M’s).  Again, participants received € 2 and were told 
that, at the end of the experiment, they would have to actually buy one of the paper 
bags with this money.     28  
At this point, participants were again randomly assigned to one of two yoked 
conditions.  In the choice condition, the shopping list consisted of eight candy names.  
Participants were free to choose as many single pieces of candy as they wanted from 
each of eight different flavors of candy.  In the no-choice condition, the shopping list 
contained the names and the desired number of six candy types and the names of the 
two target types of candy (i.e., the very and the moderately attractive type of candy).  
No-choice participants were given the opportunity to buy as much candy as they 
wanted only for the last two types of candy.   
 
Results and discussion 
We again hypothesized that participants in the choice condition would show a 
higher susceptibility to affective product features as compared to participants in the 
no-choice condition and thus purchase more of the highly appealing type of candy 
than no-choice participants.  In the present study, we also wanted to provide a direct 
test of the possibility that participants who had few regulatory resources made their 
selections randomly, rather than on the basis of affective product features as we claim.  
We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with the purchased amount of candy 
(i.e., the very attractive and the moderately attractive types of candy) as repeated 
measures and with choice (no choice versus free choice) and gender as independent 
variables.  Gender was included because we observed a marginally significant choice 
by type of candy by gender three-way interaction, F (1, 38) = 3.36, p = .07, indicating 
that the observed effects tended to be stronger for women than for men.   
The repeated measures ANOVA showed the expected choice x type of candy 
interaction, F (1, 38) = 8.99, p < .01.  The shape of the interaction indicated that 
choice participants purchased a higher quantity  of the very attractive type of candy   29  
(M = 51.01 grams, SD = 51.44 grams) than of the moderately attractive type of candy 
(M = 22.47 grams, SD = 15.99 grams), F (1, 19) = 8.89, p < .01, but that no-choice 
participants did not purchase different quantities of the very attractive candy (M = 
30.55 grams, SD = 25.35 grams) as compared to the moderately attractive candy (M = 
32.78 grams, SD = 23.45 grams), F (1, 19) = 0.36, p = .55 (see Figure 1).  From 
another perspective, we found that participants in the choice condition purchased a 
higher quantity of very attractive candy than did participants in the no-choice 
condition F (1, 38) = 4.65, p < .05, (thereby replicating Study 2) and that participants 
in the choice condition tended to purchase a lower quantity of less attractive candy as 
compared to no-choice participants, F (1, 38) = 3.19, p < .10.
5  The latter finding is 
consistent with our framework, in that choice participants apparently not only 
overweigh the affective product feature of relative attractiveness of very attractive 
candy, but also overweigh the affective product feature of relative unattractiveness of 
less attractive candy.        
Preliminary analyses did not reveal significant differences in total shopping 
time between the choice and the no-choice condition, F (1, 40) = 0.00, p = .95.   
Hence, this variable was omitted from the analyses.   
 
                                                 
5 Again, the variances differed significantly but non-parametric test led to the same conclusions for all 








Choice condition No-choice condition
Very attractive candy
Less attractive candy
Figure 1.1.  Purchased amounts (in grams) of very attractive and less attractive 
candy in the choice condition and in the no-choice condition.  
 
The results of Study 3 confirmed the view that choosing reduces consumers’ 
resistance to affective product features.  Like in Study 1 and Study 2, we found that 
there was a greater impact of affective product features after a series of active product 
choices than engaging in a no-choice task that was similar in all other respects.  In 
Study 3, we also found that people purchased more of the very attractive type of 
candy relative to the less attractive type of candy after a series of active choices.  
Because the difference between the attractive and the relatively less attractive type of 
candy increased rather than decreased in the choice condition, an alternative 




Summary of findings and limitations 
The major aim of the present investigation was to show that one of the most 
frequent activities during a shopping trip — that is, choosing — enhances consumers’   31  
susceptibility to purchasing products on the basis of affective product features.  The 
three studies reported in this paper provided support for this view.  In Study 1, we 
found that when people have made a series of active product choices they are more 
likely to buy an attractive but expensive product as compared to when they merely 
have complied with purchase instructions.  Study 2 replicated the basic effect with 
another product type (candy).  We found that when people have made a series of 
choices they buy more items of a very attractive type of candy than when they have 
followed a pre-established shopping plan.  Study 2 also eradicated the concern that 
time differences between the conditions influenced the results of Study 1.  In Study 2, 
the effect was replicated without purchase time differences between the two 
conditions.   In Study 3, we also found that people’s preference for a more attractive 
but more expensive type of candy over a less attractive but cheaper type of candy 
increases after a series of active choices.  This study also ruled out the alternative 
explanation in terms of increasing random choice in a depleted state because in the 
choice condition, the difference between the two types of candy increased rather than 
decreased. 
An often-stated criticism accompanying depletion studies is the omission of 
manipulation checks on the inferred mediator (i.e., depletion).  In our studies, we also 
decided not to include manipulation checks.  Reasons were twofold.  First, the nature 
of our theorized mediating variable “self-control resource strength” still needs to be 
clarified conceptually.  Hence, finding a suitable manipulation check for this very 
abstract “resource” is quite cumbersome.  Presumably, the resource nourishes both 
mental and physical abilities, as it has been demonstrated that performances in both 
the mental and the physical domain rely on it (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven 
et al., 1998).  Hence, the most suitable manipulation check appears to be to ask   32  
participants how they feel both physically and mentally while making their product 
choices (e.g., how much careful consideration do you put into your choices, how 
much do you deliberate before making each choice, how much do you think about 
your options prior to making your choices, how active do you feel making your 
choices, how tired do you feel right now, etc.).   
A second reason as to why we decided not to include manipulation checks is 
that these may draw attention to the purpose of the study and may contaminate 
responses to the dependent measure (Sigall & Mills, 1998).  For instance, people seem 
to harbor the belief that hard work entitles them to take rest (Kivetz & Simonson, 
2002; Martijn et al., 2002). As a result, explicit questions about fatigue that 
immediately follow a taxing choice phase may trigger that belief and produce belief-
consistent behavior.  Furthermore, Sigall and Mills (1998) argued that manipulation 
checks are unnecessary when the most plausible rival causes for the occurrence of 
certain effects are experimentally eliminated, which is what we attempted to do in this 
series of studies.  In addition, even if they are measured after the behavior (e.g., 
Wallace & Baumeister 2002), manipulation checks may provide rationalization rather 
than process measures.  
 
Alternative explanations 
The present findings are in correspondence with predictions stemming from 
the idea that both decision making and resisting the temptation of affective product 
features depend on a common, but limited, resource.  Even with these results, several 
alternative accounts should be discussed.  As noted, the findings of Study 1 were 
susceptible to two alternative explanations.  One explanation relied on a time 
confound, whereas the other explanation relied on a random choice process.  Both   33  
alternatives were however ruled out in the subsequent studies, and these subsequent 
studies provided more confidence in the reliability and robustness of our conclusions.  
Several other interpretative possibilities could be considered.  A conceptually 
different account of how prior choice-making might have an influence on subsequent 
product preferences involves the idea that choice participants may have rewarded 
themselves for their hard work by choosing the more affective option by the time they 
had to select the final product.  Related research by Khan and Dhar (2005) suggests 
that, in certain circumstances (i.e., after making utilitarian choices), prior choice-
making can induce consumers to choose self-indulgent options later on.  Although 
this explanation may be applicable to the findings of Studies 1 and 2, it is less 
applicable to the results of Study 3.  For instance, in Study 1, choices were made 
between two options of equal attractiveness and cost but for which product features 
differed.  Given that choice participants made repeated difficult choices, they may 
have decided to reward themselves for their hard work by selecting the affective 
product at the end. However, the findings of Study 3 seem to be at odds with the idea 
that choice participants felt like they had earned the right to indulge.  Choice 
participants bought more of the very attractive, but slightly less of the moderately 
attractive type of candy than no-choice participants.  Overall, choice participants did 
not buy more candy. Indulgence would seem to imply buying more of no matter what 
type of candy. 
A potential problem with our series of studies might be that we did not have a 
control condition that did not perform the tasks done in the yoked control condition.  
This raises the possibility that there is something about being in the yoked control 
condition that influences choice, rather than that there is something about repeated 
choice-making that influences choice, as we suggest.  With the current data, we   34  
cannot firmly rule out that the effect we report is not an effect of yoking.  However, 
we believe that participants in the yoked control condition did not do anything more 
than follow specific instructions, which is a very common task in a lab.  So, we 
believe that having choice rather than lacking choice is producing our results.  Other 
studies that used less stringent control conditions (e.g., rating rather than choosing) 
have also produced depletion effects in the choice condition (e.g., Vohs et al., 2004), 
which reinforces our analysis. 
 
Theoretical and managerial implications 
Previously, research has demonstrated that consumer susceptibility to affective 
product features can be strengthened by in-store atmospherics.  We build upon the 
idea that consumer’s attraction to affective product features is a crucial step to 
understanding consumer behavior, and go beyond to provide evidence for the notion 
that susceptibility to affective product features can also be enhanced by the act of 
shopping (insofar as it involves active choice-making) itself.  
The present research has implications for the literature on impulsive spending.  
In the past, some definitions have depicted impulsive spending behavior as resulting 
from certain product characteristics (Stern, 1962).  However, more recent definitions 
have portrayed it as stemming from affective experiences within the shopper (Rook, 
1987; Rook & Fisher, 1995; Rook & Hoch, 1985).  According to Hoch and 
Loewenstein (1991), consumers experience an ever-shifting conflict between desire 
and willpower.  Impulsive spending occurs whenever the desire to buy, to own, or to 
consume exceeds willpower.  In other words, it occurs whenever consumers’ capacity 
to exert self-control breaks down.  Vohs and Faber (in press) found that participants 
who lacked self-control resources because they had to control their attention or   35  
suppress certain thoughts displayed subsequently more impulsive buying tendencies 
(Study 1), were subsequently willing to pay higher prices for a variety of products 
(Study 2), and spent subsequently more money on books (Study 3) than participants 
with sufficient self-control resources.  The authors concluded that impulsive 
purchasing is a function of self-regulatory resources.  Our research lends credence to 
these theoretical accounts of impulsive spending and extends the findings of Vohs and 
Faber (in press) by providing empirical evidence for the role of regulatory resources 
in determining the relative influence of affect and cognitions on choice.  Moreover, to 
our knowledge, we are the first to both manipulate self-control depletion and assess 
the effects of this manipulation in the same consumer behavior context. 
The current findings also have several practical consumer and managerial 
implications.  For retailers, the results suggest that offering a large set of choices has 
an impact on the product attributes that consumers will take into account later in their 
shopping choices. Building on this idea, our results also suggest that the impact of 
affective product features may be expected to increase during the shopping event.  
Our results also imply that retailers would benefit from the use of expensive and 
attractive end-of-aisle-displays or delicious-looking but somewhat overpriced candy 
at cash registers.  Typically, cheaper candy items are placed at cash registers to make 
an impulse decision easy. Our results suggest that even more expensive items would 
also be purchased if made readily available at the end of the shopping trip.  
For consumers, an important implication of the present findings is that 
resisting the temptation of affective product features would be easier achieved by 
reducing the number of decisions they make in the store.  One possibility is to rely on 
the same brands or highly familiar products.  This way, self-control resources are not 
depleted.  Another solution to reduce in-store decision making would be to use a   36  
detailed shopping list containing the desired amounts for well-specified product 
brands while shopping.  Apparently however, only a little more than half (55%) of 
supermarket shoppers are inclined to use shopping lists (Block & Morwitz, 1999), and 
it is unlikely that these lists contain brand, volume, and flavor information.  In 
addition, a recent study by Oppewal and Koelemeijer (2005) has shown that adding 
items to existing assortments leads to an increase in assortment evaluation, suggesting 
that consumers like to have a lot of in-store options. 
 
Future research 
Our results raise three main questions for future research.  One issue concerns 
the consequences of depletion for consumer decisions regarding major durable goods.  
Another issue is whether the depletion effect would also be observed for other types 
of affective product cues besides the ones used here.  These questions deal with the 
generalizability of the depletion effect to other products and other product cues, 
respectively.  Finally, it might be relevant in a consumer behavior context to learn 
more about the nature of the depletion process.  Is depletion of the scarce self-control 
resource a gradual process or does depletion kick in suddenly if a certain threshold of 
choice-effort has been exceeded?  
First, the issue as to whether depletion will also have an effect on consumer 
decisions with respect to durables such as a plasma TV set, a car, or even a house, 
remains open to future research.  It has already been observed that affective 
considerations can loom larger than cognitive considerations when consumers have to 
make important decisions such as which apartment to acquire (Dhar & Wertenbroch, 
2000).  When making forfeiture decisions, consumers were found to prefer an 
apartment with a breathtaking view of the sunset and the city skyline (i.e., a positive   37  
affective product feature) and a 45 minutes distance to work (i.e., negative cognitive 
product feature) over an apartment with a view of a parking lot (i.e., a negative 
affective product feature) and a 10 minutes distance to work (i.e., a positive cognitive 
product feature).  Future research is needed to clarify whether depletion would also 
induce consumers to make similar affect-laden decisions when buying durable goods.  
We certainly believe that it could.  
This brings us to a second area for future research.  Even though we 
established a link only between repeated choice-making and subsequent susceptibility 
to affective product features such as attractiveness, the underlying model strongly 
suggests that the effects of depletion may be generalizable to other affective product 
features, such as, for instance, prestigious brand names.  In fact, any affective product 
feature should receive more weight than any cognitive product feature in the mind of 
a depleted consumer who lacks sufficient resources to resist the temptation of 
affective product features.  We call for future research that investigates the effects of 
self-control depletion on a broad range of product features.  
Finally, it would be very interesting to gain insight in the timing of the 
depletion process.  During a shopping trip, does every product choice become 
progressively more influenced by affective product features, or is some minimum 
number of repeated product choices required in order for consumers to become 
susceptible to affective features at once? We speculate that depletion does not always 
occur according to some invariable pattern, but that the nature of the process will be 
linked to the nature of the product choices.  We know from other research that one 
choice might be enough to induce depletion immediately, given that this choice is of 
considerable importance to the choice-maker (Baumeister et al., 1998).  If choices do 
not matter a lot, depletion might come into play more gradually.     38    39  
MANUSCRIPT II 
 
WHY CONSUMERS BUY LOTTERY TICKETS WHEN THE SUN GOES 







We propose that weather conditions can influence consumers’ engagement in 
lottery play.  A longitudinal study on the extent of lottery play in Belgium shows that 
lottery expenditures are indeed higher after reduced exposure to sunshine, even after 
controlling for people’s momentum, time-varying characteristics of the game, and 
deterministic seasonal components.  The results of a first laboratory study are 
consistent with these findings, and establish a link between lottery play and negative 
mood. Subsequent experiments provide evidence that depletion due to active mood 
regulation attempts, rather than mood repair, is the underlying process for the link 
between bad weather and lottery play.   40  
Although scholars disagree on when exactly the ancient tradition of lottery 
play started, there is general agreement that human beings have engaged in lottery 
play for a very long time. Archeologists even found evidence of lottery-style games 
dating back to the Egyptian Pharaohs. Lottery-raised funds have also been used to 
finance the construction of the Great Wall in China (100 BC), to replenish the French 
treasury in the mid 1500s, and to help finance the US Revolutionary War 
(http://www.naspl.org/history.html). Not only is lottery play a phenomenon of all 
times, it also occurs around the globe. State-operated lotteries are found in about half 
of the world’s countries, and their annual worldwide ticket revenues amounted to 
$115 billion in 1997 (Garrett, 2001). This should come as no surprise, given that 
consumers are often confronted with the very tempting opportunity to engage in 
lottery play. Who can say not to have at least considered buying a lottery ticket once, 
when passing by a news-stand and being confronted with an enticing lottery ad, 
informing consumers about the tremendous size of this week’s jackpot? 
Several studies have tried to cross-sectionally explain differences in the extent 
of gambling across individuals (e.g., Suzuki, Hirota, Takasawa, & Shigemasu, 2003; 
Yechiam, Stout, Busemeyer, Rock, & Finn, 2005), social strata (e.g., Spiro, 1974; 
Stranahan & Borg, 1998), or countries (e.g., Garrett, 2001).  Another stream of 
research has focused on explaining over-time variations in gambling activity within 
the same population (e.g., Farrell, Hartley, Lanot, & Walker, 2000; Farrell, 
Morgenroth, & Walker, 1999; Forrest, Gulley, & Simmons 2000a, 2000b; Gulley & 
Scott, 1993; Van Puyenbroeck, 2004), linking the extent of lottery play to such factors 
as customer momentum and time-varying characteristics of the game (we review 
these characteristics in the introduction section to Study 1). In this paper, we 
investigate whether the amount of sunshine may be another relevant factor. More   41  
specifically, we investigate whether and why the amount of sunshine one is exposed 
to may affect one’s willingness to engage in lottery play.      
According to Parker and Tavassoli (2000), several behaviors reflect an 
adaptation to variations in the duration and intensity of sunlight. For example, even 
though one would expect investors to behave rationally, research has repeatedly 
shown that stock-market returns are related to climatic indicators as the amount of 
sunshine (Hirshleifer & Shumway, 2003; Saunders, 1993). Mittal, Kamakura, and 
Govind (2004) showed that customer satisfaction with automobiles and dealership 
service depend on climatic variables, and Parker and Tavassoli (2000) established that 
consumers adapt to environments with little sunshine through a higher usage of 
stimulating substances as alcohol, coffee, and tobacco. Similarly, Parker and 
Tavassoli (2000) argued that less intense sunshine should make consumers less 
inhibited and increase impulsive buying behavior. Because of the tempting nature of 
the game, we posit that lottery play could fulfill a similar function as these impulsive 
buying behaviors (Pezza Leith & Baumeister, 1996; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 
1992; Yechiam et al., 2005). Indeed, as is the case with impulsive spending, lottery 
play will occur whenever the temptation to buy, to own, or to consume exceeds 
willpower (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991). We therefore suggest that a reduced 
exposure to sunshine may result in increased lottery play (as graphically depicted in 
the upper part of Figure 1). Evidence for this assertion is provided through a 
longitudinal study in which we analyze over eight years of semiweekly Belgian 
lottery-expenditure data. Even after controlling for many other relevant drivers, such 
as people’s momentum and time-varying reward characteristics of the game, we find 
significant support for a link between reduced sunshine in the days preceding the 
lottery draw and lottery expenditures.   42  
In subsequent laboratory studies, we investigate why this link between a 
reduction in sunlight and an increased engagement in lottery play takes place. We 
propose that a reduced exposure to sunshine leads to negative mood, which in turn 
leads to an increased engagement in lottery play (see middle panel of Figure 1). The 
first part of this chain (i.e., the link between sunshine and mood) is well-established in 
the literature (Cunningham, 1979; Eagles, 1994; Goldstein, 1972; Howerth & 
Hoffman, 1984; Persinger, 1975; Sanders & Brizzolara, 1982). The neurotransmitters 
dopamine and serotonin have been identified as mediators between natural sunlight 
and mood (Molin, Mellerup, Bolwig, Scheike, & Dam, 1996; Mittal et al., 2004; 
Parker & Tavassoli, 2000; van Praag, 1982). The subsequent link between negative 
mood and lottery play, in contrast, has, apart from some pioneering work (e.g., Pezza 
Leith & Baumeister, 1996), not yet been well-established in the literature. Therefore, 
in our second study, we first provide correlational evidence for this second link.  
In addition, we test in a sequence of studies (2, 3, and 4) two competing 
hypotheses as to why this link between bad mood and lottery play occurs. A first 
hypothesis states that  negative moods trigger the goal of mood repair (Tice, 
Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001), which may be realized through engagement in 
lottery play (Pezza Leith & Baumeister, 1996). In fact, an in the literature commonly 
stated reason for succumbing to temptations is to repair a bad mood (Herman & 
Polivy, 2004). Apparently, bad moods provide consumers with the permission to not 
exert self-control, a phenomenon labeled ‘acquiescence’ in self-control literature 
(Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). Acquiescence has been argued to often be 
evidenced in impulsive spending behavior (Baumeister, 2002). The reasoning that 
mood repair may be realized through engagement in lottery play rests on the 
assumption that engagement in lottery play removes negative affect. It outlines a   43  
causal chain in which negative mood leads to an increasing engagement in lottery 
play through the activation of a mood repair goal (see hypothesis 1 in the lower part 
of Figure 1). In this model, lottery play serves as a means to repair one’s bad mood. 
Hence, lottery play is instrumental to mood repair. For the remainder of the paper, we 
refer to this causal chain as the mood repair explanation for lottery play.  
The second hypothesis builds on the theory of self-control depletion. 
According to the self-regulatory resource model (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven, 
Tice, & Baumeister, 1998), all acts of self-control draw on a common limited resource 
that is akin to energy or strength. Hence, exertion of self-control is followed by a 
period of diminished capacity to exert subsequent self-control (i.e., self-control 
depletion). Recently, Baumeister (2002) has outlined the applicability of self-control 
processes to consumer behavior. Depletion has been linked to consumer behavior that 
is not conducive to long-term self-interest, such as impulsive spending (Vohs & 
Faber, in press) and susceptibility to affective product features (Bruyneel, Dewitte, 
Vohs, & Warlop, in press). Basically, as resisting temptation has been found to rely 
on the scarce self-control resource (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), consumers in a state 
of depletion will be more likely to yield to temptation. One instance of yielding to 
temptation might be to buy lottery tickets. Hence, processes that undermine self-
control should lead to more lottery play. One factor that has been argued to weaken 
self-control is active mood regulation (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Vohs & 
Heatherton, 2000). People have been shown to engage in active attempts to regulate 
their mood whenever they experience negative emotions (Tice, Bratslavsky, & 
Baumeister, 2001). Yet, active attempts to regulate emotions deplete the same 
common, limited resource that is needed to resist temptations such as an opportunity 
to buy lottery tickets (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). Thus, this line of reasoning outlines   44  
a causal chain in which negative mood leads to active mood regulation attempts that 
are depleting in nature. In other words, people who experience a negative mood will 
actively attempt to regulate their mood and in this process consume scarce self-control 
resources. The resulting state of depletion, in turn, leads to an increasing engagement 
in lottery play. Indeed, depleted people will have fewer self-control resources left and 
will suffer from a reduced resistance to the temptation to engage in lottery play (see 
hypothesis 2 in the lower part of Figure 1). In what follows, we refer to this 
competing causal chain as the depletion explanation for lottery play. To the best of 
our knowledge, the claim that bad moods result in yielding to temptation through 
depletion following active mood regulation attempts has not been put forward in the 
literature so far. In contrast to the often-cited mood repair hypothesis (Baumeister, 
Heatherton & Tice, 1994; Baumeister, 2002; Herman & Polivy, 2004), which states 
that bad moods result in an unwillingness to forego temptations, the competing 


















Figure 2.1.  Link between sunshine, mood, and lottery play.  
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If mood repair is the underlying process for the link between bad mood and 
lottery play, we should find that lottery play is related to the extent to which people feel 
bad at the moment they are given the opportunity to buy lottery tickets. In contrast, if 
depletion due to active mood regulation attempts underlies the link between bad mood 
and lottery play, bad mood should increase the engagement in active mood regulation, 
which reduces subsequent resistance to temptations such as lottery play. It is important 
to point out that according to this process, we should find that lottery play is related to 
the extent to which people felt bad some time before they are given the opportunity to 
buy lottery tickets. The latter model implies a lag of several minutes that allows people 
to engage in active mood regulation attempts (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998). This model 
makes no predictions as to people’s mood at the moment they are given the opportunity 
to buy lottery tickets, however. Indeed, although attempts to actively regulate bad 
moods are likely to lead to decreased self-control resources, these attempts may or may 
not be successful, that is, they do not necessarily lead to improvements in bad moods 
(Vohs & Baumeister, 2000).    
             The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Using an extensive time 
series of actual lottery expenditures, we first establish the link between bad weather and 
an increased engagement in lottery play. In three laboratory studies, we show that bad 
mood is a driver for this phenomenon. We test the mood repair and the depletion 
accounts of the link between bad mood and lottery play against each other and find 
evidence for the latter and not for the former. This combination of longitudinal, 
secondary-data, analysis with various controlled experiments should contribute to the 
external and internal validity of our substantive conclusions.  
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Study 1 
 
     Several studies on gambling behavior have appeared in recent literature. A lot of 
these studies have focused on anomalies in lottery play such as the favorite-longshot 
bias in horse racing (e.g., Vaughan Williams & Paton, 1997) and the gamblers’ fallacy 
in lotteries (e.g., Terrell, 1994). The favorite-longshot bias in horse race betting refers 
to ‘underbetting’ short-odds (favorite) horses and ‘overbetting’ long-odds horses 
relative to their objective probabilities of winning.  The gambler’s fallacy refers to the 
bettor’s belief that the probability of an event is lowered when the event has occurred 
recently, although the probability is known to be independent across trials. Other 
studies have focused on cross-sectional differences in gambling behavior (Suzuki et al., 
2003; Spiro, 1974; Yechiam et al., 2005). One particularly robust finding in this respect 
is the observation that poorer people spend a higher percentage of their income on 
lottery tickets than more wealthy people (e.g., Stranahan & Borg, 1998).  
     At an aggregate level, Garrett (2001) provided an empirical analysis on lottery 
games across 82 different countries. He found significant differences in sales per capita 
and in sales as a percentage of GDP per capita across continents and countries. 
Differences in the income elasticity of demand for lottery tickets across continents and 
countries were observed as well. These findings provide some indirect evidence that 
climate might influence lottery play. However, more conclusive evidence for the link 
between weather conditions and lottery play would be provided by means of a 
longitudinal study including climate as an explanatory variable.  
     Several longitudinal studies on the underlying drivers of lottery play have already 
been conducted.  Using UK data, Farrell, Morgenroth, and Walker (1999) found that 
the extent of lottery play was strongly influenced by momentum in consumers’   48  
gambling behavior, as the extent of lottery play in the previous period had a significant 
positive effect on lottery play in the period of interest.  It was also found that rollovers 
heightened the potential addictiveness of numbers games. Rollovers occur when no 
player selects the full set of winning numbers in the current draw.  The jackpot prize 
money of the current draw is then added to the jackpot pool for the following draw. In 
another UK study, the impact of both rollovers and super-draws was explained in terms 
of the changes they induce in the expected value of lottery tickets (Forrest, Gulley, & 
Simmons, 2000b). Super-draws occur when the game organizers exercise their option 
to add to the jackpot fund. In a related UK study, Forrest, Gulley, and Simmons (2000a) 
replicated the finding that sizes of rollovers and super-draws had an important positive 
impact on the expected value of lottery tickets.  In addition, they found evidence that 
Wednesday lottery draws were significantly less popular than Saturday lottery draws.  
The latter result was consistent with the findings of Gulley and Scott (1993), who, in a 
US setting, found a strong tendency for midweek draws to be less attractive. In another 
UK study, Farrell et al. (2000) affirmed that rollovers produce increases in the expected 
value of holding a lottery ticket.  Virtually all results were replicated in the Belgian 
lottery market by Van Puyenbroeck (2004), who also found that the day of the week on 
which the draw took place (i.e., Wednesday or Saturday), rollovers, and super-draws 
affected lottery play through changes in the expected value of the lottery tickets.   
     Taken  together,  these  studies  find  evidence of systematic patterns explaining 
variability in lottery play over time. In the present study, we assess whether weather 
conditions, and more specifically the number of hours of sunshine in the days preceding 
the lottery draw (i.e., in the period one can buy the tickets), have additional explanatory 
power, even after controlling for these aforementioned factors.    49  
                        The setting used for our study was the Belgian “lotto game”, which is 
comparable to the games considered in the previous studies. Similar in format to many 
US state lotteries, the Belgian lotto game is a 6 / 42 numbers game. The nominal price 
is fixed and unchanging: € 0.50 must be paid for each combination of six numbers 
entered in the game. As the Belgian lotto game is very popular (i.e., sales typically 
amount to about 0.475% of GDP; Garrett, 2001), a substantial jackpot pool is generated 
for each draw. Approximately 50% of this pool is awarded to ticket holders that match 
several numbers of the balls drawn. The jackpot is shared by those (if any) matching 6 
correct numbers and smaller prizes are awarded to players with partially correct entries. 
The other 50% is shared by the operator, the distributors, and good causes. If no player 
selects the full set of winning numbers, a rollover is declared and the jackpot prize 
money is added to the jackpot pool for the following draw. Draws take place 
semiweekly, on Saturdays and Wednesdays. Rollovers are carried forward from one 
Wednesday to the next and from one Saturday to the next. Occasionally, the game 
organizers exercise their option to add to the jackpot fund. This results in a so-called 
super-draw.  
In the study, we assessed whether the weather conditions in the three days 
preceding a lottery draw affects total lottery expenditures. As the lottery draw takes 
place in the evening to enable the public to still buy tickets the day of the draw, this 
amounts to the number of hours of sunshine on Thursday, Friday and Saturday for 
Saturday draws, and on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday for Wednesday evening 
draws. The sunshine data were accumulated across three days to have a comparable 
number of days preceding both draws, and to make the level of data aggregation 
comparable to that of the dependent variable. As such, abstraction was made of the 
number of hours of sunshine on Sunday.    50  
                Data on lottery sales and game characteristics were made available by the 
National Lottery of Belgium, whereas daily sunshine data were obtained from the 
Belgian meteorological institute Belgocontrol. Our period of analysis was from October 
1993 until August 2002, resulting in 925 semiweekly lottery draws. There was 
considerable variability in the number of hours of sunshine, ranging from 0.00 to 15.40 
(M = 4.49, SD = 4.19). To account for diminishing returns to scale, both the dependent 
variable (lottery expenditures) and the key explanatory variable (combined number of 
hours of sunshine in the days preceding the lottery draw) were log-transformed.  As a 
few observations experienced zero sunshine hours, we followed common practice and 
added a small number to each observation before taking the log-transform.
6  A graph of 
both series is presented in Figure 2. For expository purpose, we present the final year of 
the data in Figure 2 (comparable patterns were obtained in the other years). The 
expenditure series clearly shows the influence of occasional super-draws. The jigsaw 
pattern in the expenditures series also shows that the Saturday draws (odd position in 
the series) are more popular than Wednesday draws (even position).  
                                                 
6 The size of this number was varied from 0.1 to 1.0 (reported in table 1), but this did not affect our substantive 
conclusion on the significance of any of the effects. 
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     In line with previous research, we added the following control variables to the 
model: a dummy variable to indicate whether it was a Saturday draw, two 
autoregressive terms to account for momentum in people’s gambling behavior, an 
indicator variable to denote whether or not there was a rollover, and the size of the 
super-draw. The first autoregressive term allows for momentum across draws on two 
different days (e.g., whether the gambling behavior on Saturday is influenced by the 
gambling behavior the preceding Wednesday), whereas the second autoregressive term 
captures the time dependence across common days. A rollover took place in 13% of the 
cases, and in 3.6% of the cases, the game organizers exercised their option to announce 
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Table 2.1 
Underlying drivers of lottery expenditures.  
                                               Dependent Variable  

























n = 925 
R
2
adj = 0.932 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
          Parameter estimates and white heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
presented in Table 1. In line with previous findings (see e.g., Farrell et al., 2000; 
Farrell, Morgenroth, & Walker, 1999; Forrest, Gulley, & Simmons, 2000a, 2000b; 
Gulley & Scott, 1993; Van Puyenbroeck, 2004), we observed that the day of the week 
on which the draw took place, momentum in people’s gambling behavior, and the 
presence of rollovers as well as the size of the super-draw (if any) all had a highly 
significant effect on lottery expenditures. In combination, these findings offer 
considerable face validity to our model. Most importantly, however, we found that, 
even though the combined control variables already resulted in an R
2
adj of 0.93, the   54  
sunshine-variable still had a significant negative effect (β = -0.01, p < 0.05) on lottery 
revenue.  
       This  effect  stayed  significant,  even when we controlled for other seasonal 
influences  through the inclusion of two harmonic (sine, cosine) deterministic 
components (see Hanssens, Parsons, & Schultz, 2003, p. 46, for a review on other 
marketing applications of this procedure).  Hence, even after controlling for other 
seasonal factors that might explain more lottery play in certain times of the year (e.g. 
the timing of the holiday season, or differential business/consumer expectations in 
certain times of the year), the incremental impact of the number of hours of sunshine in 
the days preceding the lottery draw stayed significant, which confirmed our prior 
expectation
7.   
          In  the  subsequent  laboratory studies, we assess some potential underlying 
mechanisms for this effect. Specifically, two competing explanations for this result are 
investigated. Both rely on weather-induced negative mood as a potential driver of the 
link between sunlight exposure and lottery play. One hypothesis states that lottery play 
could be instrumental for repairing one’s bad mood, whereas the other hypothesis states 
that lottery play might be a mere consequence of depletion due to active mood 




                                                 
    
7 One could argue that consumers are more inclined to stay indoors in bad-weather conditions, and to go 
out in case of good-weather conditions, which might in turn affect their lottery-buying behavior. 
However, in the period under study, buying lottery tickets by phone or through the internet was not 
possible. As such, the implied reduced-ability argument would actually work in the opposite direction, 
making our significant negative result a more conservative estimate.   55  
Study 2 
 
          Study 2 is a laboratory study that is correlational in nature. As already argued, a 
reduced exposure to sunshine has consistently been found to lead to negative mood 
(Cunningham, 1979; Eagles, 1994; Goldstein, 1972; Howerth & Hoffman, 1984; 
Persinger, 1975; Sanders & Brizzolara, 1982). Although the link between sunshine and 
mood is well-documented in the literature, the link between mood and lottery play is 
not. Hence, the first aim of Study 2 is to demonstrate that lottery play is indeed related 
to negative mood. Its second aim is to find preliminary support for one of the proposed 
underlying processes for the link between negative mood and lottery play.  
          We  assessed  participants’ mood states upon entering the laboratory. 
Subsequently, participants engaged in a creativity task during which they were given 
the opportunity to regulate their moods. Afterwards, participants’ mood states were 
assessed once more. Finally, participants were given the opportunity to buy lottery 
tickets. We expect to find a positive correlation between negative mood and lottery 
expenditures. In addition, if mood repair explains the link between negative mood and 
lottery play, negative mood as measured immediately before participants are given the 
opportunity to buy lottery tickets should be more predictive of lottery expenditures than 
negative mood as measured some minutes before that opportunity. In contrast, if 
depletion explains the link, negative mood as measured some minutes before 
participants are given the opportunity to buy lottery tickets should be more predictive 
than negative mood as measured immediately before the opportunity to buy lottery 
tickets. Indeed, according to the depletion explanation, it takes some minutes before 
mood regulation attempts will lead to a state of depletion (Baumeister et al., 1998), and 
hence before people will become susceptible to lottery play.    56  
 
Method 
          Participants.  Participants were 46 undergraduate students (20 men and 26 
women). Ages ranged from 18 to 33 years (M = 21.78 years, SD = 2.50 years). 
Participants received € 6 for their cooperation. 
          Materials and Procedure. A miniature lottery bowl containing 42 lottery balls 
(i.e., the number of lottery balls used in the Belgian lottery) was placed in the 
laboratory. Participants came to the laboratory in groups of seven to nine persons. Each 
participant was assigned a seat in a partially enclosed cubicle and worked individually 
for the main part of the study. Upon arrival, participants received their participation fee 
and filled out an informed consent form.  
          As  a  first  task,  the  Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) was administered (i.e., PANAS1). The PANAS consists of 10 positive 
and 10 negative mood items assessing participants’ current mood state
8.  For each item, 
answers were given on a five-point Likert scale ranging from Right now, I feel this way 
very slightly or not at all (1) to Right now, I feel this way extremely (5).  
          After the PANAS was administered, participants left their individual cubicles and 
were asked to collectively engage in a creativity task that lasted for approximately 25 
minutes. As creativity tasks have been shown to induce people to regulate their mood 
upward (Cohen & Andrade, 2004), participants were assumed to engage in active 
upward mood regulation during the creativity task. On turn, they had to pronounce a 
word of which the first letter had to match the last letter of the previous word.  
                                                 
8 As negative mood items are more relevant to the present research setting, we opted throughout the 
paper not to report the results for the positive mood items for reasons of clarity.    57  
          After the creativity task, participants again took place in the partially enclosed 
cubicles. Once more, the PANAS was administered (i.e., PANAS2). We administered 
the PANAS twice to find out at which moment mood was more predictive of lottery 
play.  
          In the next phase of the study, participants were given the opportunity to engage 
in a 6 / 42 numbers game. This format was chosen because it corresponded to the real-
life format, thereby increasing consistency with the aforementioned longitudinal study 
on secondary data and providing participants with a sense of familiarity towards the 
game. Participants were free to determine if and how many lottery tickets they bought. 
Each ticket cost € .50, and had to be bought with their participation fee. Participants 
knew that the draw would take place when all experimental sessions were over and all 
participants in the study had received the opportunity to buy lottery tickets (i.e., a few 
days after they themselves had received the chance to play at the utmost), and that they 
would be informed about the results of the draw through e-mail immediately after it had 
taken place. They also knew the approximate number of participants to take part in the 
study, and were told that the size of the jackpot would depend on the stakes. Thus, in 
correspondence with a real-life lottery, participants did not know how big the payout 
would be. Our dependent measure was each participant’s amount of lottery 
expenditures.  
 
Results and Discussion 
     We conducted a regression analysis with both indicators of mood as predictor 
variables and lottery expenditures (overall M = € 0.54, SD = € 0.55) as the dependent 
variable. As gender and age effects did not affect our conclusions, these factors are 
further ignored. Negative mood as measured at the beginning of the session (i.e.,   58  
PANAS1; αNA1 = .85; M = 1.40, SD = 0.41) turned out to be significantly positively 
correlated with lottery expenditures (β = .07, t = 2.05, p < .05). In other words, the 
worse participants felt when they entered the lab, the higher their lottery expenditures 
25 minutes later. This finding supports the hypothesis that lottery play is related to 
negative mood. In addition, as lottery expenditures were related to the extent to which 
people felt bad some time before they were given the opportunity to buy tickets, this 
finding is consistent with the depletion explanation. Negative mood as measured 
immediately before participants were given the opportunity to buy lottery tickets (i.e., 
PANAS2; αNA2 = .79; M = 1.31, SD = 0.37), in contrast, did not significantly predict 
lottery expenditures (β = -.03, t = -0.87, NS). This finding is inconsistent with the mood 
repair explanation.  
     The depletion explanation would be supported further if mood changes would 
predict lottery expenditures. We therefore conducted a regression analysis with the 
following two explanatory variables: (i) the negative mood as measured immediately 
before participants had the opportunity to buy lottery tickets (i.e., PANAS2), and (ii) 
the difference between negative mood as measured at the beginning of the session and 
as measured immediately before participants had the opportunity to buy lottery tickets 
(i.e., PANAS1-PANAS2). Lottery expenditures was the dependent variable. The 
negative mood difference score was positive (i.e., negative mood at time 2 was 
significantly smaller than negative mood at time 1, t (45) = 2.50, p < .05), indicating 
that mood had indeed, as predicted by Cohen and Andrade (2004), recovered during the 
creative word game. The change in negative mood turned out to be significantly 
positively correlated with lottery expenditures (β = .06, t = 2.09, p < .05), while 
PANAS2 was not (t = 0.80, NS). Hence, the bigger the reduction in negative mood, the   59  
higher lottery expenditures were. This finding provides further support for the depletion 
explanation.  
          In conclusion, the outcome of our analyses showed that negative mood predicts 
lottery expenditures. In addition, this study provides preliminary support for the 
assertion that depletion due to active mood regulation attempts rather than mood repair 
is the underlying process for the link between bad mood and lottery play. In two 
follow-up studies, we try to find further evidence for the depletion explanation of 
lottery play. In a third study, we manipulate mood and depletion orthogonally. In a 
fourth study, we induce bad moods and manipulate whether subsequent mood 
regulation attempts are depleting or not. In both studies, we assess the impact of our 
manipulations on lottery play. To provide additional evidence for a causal link between 
reduced exposure to sunshine and an increased engagement in lottery play driven by 
negative mood, we manipulate mood through exposure to sunshine. This is 
implemented through a script-reading procedure in which participants are confronted 




          The aim of Study 3 is to experimentally manipulate weather-related mood and to 
find further evidence for the hypothesis that the link between bad mood and lottery play 
rests on the depleting nature of active mood regulation attempts rather than on the 
mood repairing nature of lottery play. We induce either a bad or a good mood state in 
participants, and ask them to subsequently engage in a task that was either depleting or 
not. Afterwards, all participants are given the opportunity to buy lottery tickets. If mood 
repair explains the link between bad mood and lottery expenditures, the latter should be   60  
higher for participants in a bad mood than for those in a good mood, regardless of their 
level of self-control depletion. In contrast, if depletion explains the link between bad 
mood and lottery expenditures, lottery expenditures should be higher for depleted than 
for non-depleted participants, regardless of their mood state. 
 
Method 
          Participants.  Participants were 71 undergraduate students (32 men and 39 
women). Data from 3 participants were discarded because they did not comply with the 
instructions. Ages ranged from 17 to 28 years (M = 21.04 years, SD = 2.29 years). 
Participants received € 6 for their cooperation.  
          Materials and Procedure. The procedure of Study 3 was identical to the one of 
Study 2, apart from the following. To increase the sensitivity of the PANAS used in 
Study 2, we administered a visual analogue version (Franik & Pathak, 2003). For each 
item, participants were asked to indicate on a 100 mm line to what extent they felt the 
particular emotion.  
          After filling out an initial PANAS (i.e., PANAS1), participants were assigned to 
one of the four conditions resulting from crossing the mood manipulation (negative 
versus positive) with depletion (high versus low). The mood manipulation was induced 
by asking participants to read a one-page description of a character that was walking 
around in a solitary landscape (see Wenzlaff, Wegner, & Roper, 1998 for the original 
use of script reading as mood induction procedure). Participants were asked to imagine 
that they themselves were this character. For half of the participants, the character 
walked around in sunny weather conditions. Therefore, these participants were 
hypothesized to develop a positive mood. For the other half of the participants, the   61  
character walked around in cloudy weather conditions. Hence, these participants were 
hypothesized to develop a negative mood (e.g., van Praag, 1982).  
          Next, participants were asked to fill out the PANAS once more (i.e., PANAS2). 
This was done to validate that the mood manipulation influenced participants’ mood 
states as expected. Afterwards, the depletion manipulation was induced by means of a 
variation of a Stroop color-naming task. Participants were asked to indicate the ink 
color of 50 words. The words of which the color had to be indicated were always color 
names (e.g., blue). In the non-depleting conditions, words and ink colors were matched 
(e.g., RED in red ink). In the depleting conditions however, words and ink colors were 
mismatched (e.g., RED in yellow ink). In addition, participants in the depleting 
condition faced an exception to this rule. In case a word in blue ink appeared on the 
screen, they were instructed to indicate the word rather than the ink color. These 
deviating trials occurred in 25% of the trials. Because of the need to override impulses 
and dominant responses, this task was hypothesized to be depleting. A similar task 
proved to be a successful depletion manipulation in earlier research (Wallace & 
Baumeister, 2002).  
          Subsequently, participants filled out the PANAS one last time (i.e., PANAS3). 
This was needed to validate that mood states did not change during the Stroop color-
naming task. In fact, in both depleting and non-depleting conditions, participants in bad 
mood states should be unable to engage in attempts to actively regulate their moods, 
since Stroop color-naming tasks consume the attentional processes that are required in 
active mood regulation (Baumeister et al., 1998).  
          Finally, participants were given the opportunity to engage in a 6 / 42 numbers 
game. As in Study 2, our dependent measure was lottery expenditures.  
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Results and Discussion 
          Preliminary analyses revealed that our weather-induced mood manipulation was 
successful. After the mood induction (αNA2 = .93), negative mood was significantly 
larger in the bad mood condition (M = 18.84, SD = 17.25) than in the good mood 
condition (M = 11.42, SD = 10.56), t (69) = 2.16, p < .05. Before the mood induction, 
the mood conditions did not differ in negative mood (αNA1 = .89, bad mood condition: 
M = 14.94, SD = 14.83; good mood condition: M = 12.73, SD = 11.15), t (69) = 0.70, 
NS. 
          Additional analyses also revealed that mood states did not change during the 
Stroop color-naming task. In the depleting condition, negative mood as measured 
before the Stroop color-naming task (i.e., NA2; M = 16.61, SD = 15.90) was not 
significantly different from negative mood as measured after the Stroop color-naming 
task (i.e., NA3; M = 14.86, SD = 12.67), t (34) = 0.89, NS. Similarly, in the non-
depleting condition, negative mood as measured before the Stroop color-naming task 
(i.e., NA2; M = 14.00, SD = 13.78) was not significantly different from negative mood 
as measured after the Stroop color-naming task (i.e., NA3; M = 12.47, SD = 10.12), t 
(34) = 1.19, NS.  
          To test our hypothesis that depletion predicts engagement in lottery play, we 
conducted a two by two ANOVA using mood (manipulated bad mood versus good 
mood) and depletion (depletion versus no depletion) as the independent variables. We 
found a significant main effect of depletion, indicating that lottery expenditures were 
higher for depleted (M = € 0.57, SD = € 0.63) than for non-depleted participants (M = € 
0.32, SD = € 0.32), F(1, 67) = 5.01, p < .05, irrespective of their mood state. Neither the 
main effect of mood, F(1, 67) = 0.64, NS, nor the mood by depletion interaction effect, 
F(1, 67) = 2.27, NS, were significant.    63  
          Overall, the results of Study 3 provide considerable support for the depletion 
explanation, and fail to provide support for the mood repair explanation of lottery play. 
These findings are consistent with the findings of Study 2. So far, we find evidence that 
depletion plays a role. However, we have not yet presented evidence that depletion due 
to attempts to actively regulate one’s bad mood is a precursor of lottery play. Hence, we 
conduct a fourth study that is complimentary to Study 3 and in which we manipulate 




          The aim of the fourth study is to experimentally manipulate depletion due to 
engagement in active mood regulation attempts, and to find further evidence that 
depletion due to this engagement in active mood regulation attempts underlies the link 
between bad mood and lottery play. We induce a bad mood state in all participants. 
Subsequently, we ask participants to engage in a mood regulation task that was either 
depleting in nature or not. More specifically, one half of the participants is asked to 
attempt to actively regulate their bad moods through engagement in a thought-listing 
task (i.e., mood regulation of a depleting nature), whereas the other half’s mood is 
repaired through a mood induction procedure (i.e., mood regulation of a non-depleting 
nature). Afterwards, all participants are given the opportunity to buy lottery tickets. We 
expect that lottery expenditures will be higher for participants who engage in mood 
regulation attempts of a depleting nature than for participants who engage in mood 
regulation attempts of a non-depleting nature. 
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Method 
          Participants.  Participants were 27 undergraduate students (5 men and 22 
women). Ages ranged from 18 to 28 years (M = 21.74 years, SD = 2.35 years). 
Participants received € 6 for their cooperation.  
          Materials and Procedure. The procedure of Study 4 was identical to the one of 
Study 3, apart from the following. After filling out the visual analogue format of the 
PANAS (i.e., PANAS1), receiving the weather-induction of a bad mood (i.e., reading a 
one-page description of a character walking around in cloudy weather conditions), and 
filling out the visual analogue format of the PANAS for a second time to validate that 
the mood manipulation influenced their mood states as expected (i.e., PANAS2), 
participants were assigned to one of two experimental conditions.  
          In both conditions, participants were asked to engage in a task that enabled them 
to change their bad mood state. Participants in the depleting condition were asked to 
engage in a thought-listing task. They were guaranteed confidentiality and urged to 
write down their stream of consciousness.  This task gave participants the opportunity 
to engage in active mood regulation attempts, something people spontaneously do 
whenever they feel bad (Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001). However, as active 
attempts to regulate mood result in depletion (Vohs & Baumeister, 2000), this task was 
hypothesized to be depleting. Participants in the non-depleting condition were subjected 
to a mood induction procedure. They were asked to hand-copy a text to yoke them to 
participants in the other condition (see, for example, Zuckerman, Porac, Lathin, Smith, 
& Deci, 1978 for the use of a yoked experimental design) with respect to the physical 
effort they had to exert. The text resulted from a thought-listing task in an independent 
pilot study in which we induced a bad mood state in the same way as we did in Study 3, 
and in which we subsequently asked participants to attempt to actively regulate their   65  
bad mood. This text was used as a mood induction procedure (e.g., Tice, Bratslavsky, 
& Baumeister, 2001). As participants in this condition did not have an opportunity to 
attempt to regulate their mood actively, the mere hand-copying of this pre-generated 
text was hypothesized to be considerably less depleting.  
          In the next phase of the study, participants filled out the PANAS one last time 
(i.e., PANAS3). This was done to assess how participants’ mood states were influenced 
by their active or passive mood regulation attempts. Finally, participants were given the 
opportunity to engage in a 6 / 42 numbers game. As before, our dependent variable was 
lottery expenditures. 
 
Results and Discussion 
          Preliminary analyses revealed that our mood manipulation was successful: the 
bad mood induction increased negative mood. Negative mood as measured after the bad 
mood induction (i.e., PANAS2; αNA2 = .91; M = 19.00, SD = 13.78) was significantly 
higher than negative mood as measured before the bad mood induction (i.e., PANAS1; 
αNA1 = .85; M = 14.60, SD = 12.09), t (25) = 2.09, p < .05).  
          Preliminary  analyses  also  revealed that mood regulation in the non-depleting 
condition was successful: the good mood induction decreased negative mood. Negative 
mood as measured before the mood regulation task (i.e., PANAS2; M = 21.73, SD = 
14.60) was significantly higher than negative mood as measured after the mood 
regulation task (i.e., PANAS3; αNA3 = .85; M = 13.66, SD = 12.58), t (13) = 3.23, p < 
.01. In contrast, preliminary analyses revealed that mood regulation in the depleting 
condition was unsuccessful: thought-listing did not decrease negative mood. Negative 
mood as measured before the mood regulation task (i.e., PANAS2; M = 16.05, SD = 
12.75) was not significantly different from negative mood as measured after the mood   66  
regulation task (i.e., PANAS3; M = 17.63, SD = 9.90), t (12) = -0.46, NS. This finding 
is in line with previous literature stating that attempts to actively regulate bad moods 
are likely to lead to decreased self-control resources, but will generally not lead to 
improvements in bad moods (Vohs & Baumeister, 2000). Negative mood as measured 
before the mood regulation task (i.e., PANAS2) was not significantly different in the 
depleting (M = 16.05, SD = 12.75) and the non-depleting condition (M = 21.73, SD = 
14.60), t (25) = -1.07, NS. Despite the different impact of the mood regulation task on 
negative mood in both conditions, negative mood as measured after the mood 
regulation task (i.e., PANAS3) was also far from significantly different in the depleting 
(M = 17.63, SD = 9.90) and the non-depleting condition (M = 13.66, SD = 12.58), t (25) 
= 0.91, NS. This lack of differences in negative affect rules out negative mood as an 
explanation for the effect of mood regulation type on lottery expenditures reported next. 
As an additional check, we included both measures as covariates in subsequent 
analyses.    
          We conducted a one-way ANOVA using mood regulation type (depleting versus 
not depleting) as an independent variable. The dependent variable was lottery 
expenditures. We found a significant effect of mood regulation type, indicating that 
lottery expenditures were significantly higher for participants who engaged in attempts 
to actively regulate their bad moods (i.e., mood regulation attempts of a depleting 
nature; M = € 0.81, SD = € 0.75) than for participants whose mood was regulated by 
means of the mood induction procedure (i.e., mood regulation attempts of a non-
depleting nature; M = € 0.25, SD = € 0.33), F(1, 25) = 6.44, p < .05. Negative mood as 
measured before the mood regulation task (i.e., PANAS2) was not significantly 
correlated with lottery expenditures (r = -.06, NS). The effect of mood regulation type 
on lottery expenditures remained unchanged (F(1, 24) = 6.12, p < .05), when negative   67  
mood as measured before the mood regulation was included as a covariate (i.e., 
PANAS2, F(1, 24) = 0.04, NS). Negative mood as measured after the mood regulation 
task (i.e., PANAS3) was also not significantly correlated with lottery expenditures (r = 
.16, NS). The effect of mood regulation type on lottery expenditures remained again 
unchanged (F(1, 24) = 5.65, p < .05), when negative mood as measured after the mood 
regulation was included as a covariate (i.e., PANAS3, F(1, 24) = 0.20, NS). Hence, 
Study 4 provided further evidence that depletion due to active mood regulation attempts 
is the underlying process for the link between weather-induced negative mood and an 




          The aim of the present investigation was to show that bad weather or weather-
induced bad mood lead to an increased engagement in lottery play. In addition, we 
wanted to find out if depletion due to active mood regulation attempts or mood repair is 
the underlying process. The results of our research indicate that a shortage of sunshine 
induces people to engage in active mood regulation attempts of a depleting nature, 
resulting in insufficient resources to resist lottery play. In a longitudinal study on over 
eight years of semiweekly lottery expenditure data, we find that a reduced exposure to 
sunshine in the days preceding the lottery draw resulted in higher lottery revenues. This 
result is obtained even after controlling for various other factors that have been 
identified in the literature, including the well-documented momentum in lottery play, 
time-varying reward characteristics of the game such as the presence of a rollover 
and/or super-draw, and seasonal influences.    68  
          The results of a follow-up laboratory study are consistent with the findings of the 
real-life study on secondary data, and establish that lottery play is related to negative 
mood, but only when there is a time interval that gives people the opportunity to 
actively regulate their mood. This data pattern is consistent with an explanation of the 
link between sunshine and lottery play in terms of depletion due to depleting mood 
regulation attempts but not in terms of mood repair (see hypothesis 2 in the lower part 
of Figure 1). Two subsequent experiments provide further evidence that depletion due 
to active mood regulation attempts rather than mood repair is the process underlying the 
link between bad mood due to weather and lottery play. Hence, the combined use of a 
modelling and experimental approach enabled us to establish causal relations between 
the variables of interest, while enhancing the external validity of our results.     
          Our studies support that depletion due to active mood regulation attempts, rather 
than mood repair, is the underlying process for the link between bad mood and yielding 
to temptation.  As a consequence,  previous literature suggesting that consumers in bad 
mood states are motivated to repair their bad mood states, and hence unwilling to resist 
temptations (Baumeister, 2002; Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Herman & 
Polivy, 2004), should be re-examined in the light of the depletion hypothesis proposing 
that consumers in bad mood states may be unable to resist temptations.   
          In  past  literature,  lottery  play has sometimes been presented as risk-taking 
behavior, which has also been linked to mood (e.g., Isen & Geva, 1987; Parker & 
Tavassoli, 2000; Pezza Leith & Baumeister, 1996). More specifically, it has been stated 
that consumers in negative mood states are willing to take risks in order to obtain an 
outcome that would make them feel happy, whereas consumers in positive mood states 
are reluctant to take risks in order to avoid an outcome that would make them feel sad. 
In our studies, we did not regard lottery play as risk-taking behavior, but rather as   69  
yielding to a temptation (think back to our character in the introduction that passes by a 
news-stand and is tempted by the promising lottery ad). Although we acknowledge that 
risk could indeed be an issue in certain betting situations (e.g., if certain outcomes have 
further negative implications), this was less of an issue both in the real-life setting of 
the Belgian lotto game and in our laboratory studies, where the intrinsic risk is small. 
Not only do players typically buy lottery tickets for a small amount of money, once 
they have spent this money, they have nothing left to loose, only a lot to win. It is 
important to note that defining lottery play as risk-taking behavior corresponds closely 
to the mood repair hypothesis because the risk-taking itself is believed to alleviate the 
bad mood. Our failure to find support for the mood repair hypothesis casts doubt on the 
viability of the definition of lottery play as risk-taking behavior.   
          Our results raise five main questions for future research. One question is whether 
there are more lottery players, or whether the same players simply invest more in case 
of reduced sunlight. A second issue concerns the underlying reason as to why lottery 
expenditures are higher for depleted consumers. Third, one could wonder about the 
type of mood regulation that will lead to depletion and hence, to lottery play. Another 
issue is the generalizability of the depletion effect to other consumer behaviors besides 
lottery play. Finally, other antecedents of self-control depletion besides a shortage of 
sunlight might be relevant in a consumer behavior context.  
          First, one might wonder whether our aggregate finding of increased lottery play 
in case of reduced sunshine is due primarily to new players entering the game, or to 
existing players spending more. Data limitations prevented us from making this 
distinction in Study 1, while statistical power considerations made us opt to not split the 
various cells in our experiments further in, respectively, players and non-players. Still, 
we encourage further research into this issue.   70  
          Second, the issue as to why depletion leads to an increased engagement in lottery 
play remains open to future research. We know that potential players are attracted by 
the size of the jackpot prize but repelled by their low chances of winning this jackpot 
prize (e.g., Farrell, Morgenroth, & Walker, 1999; Forrest, Gulley, & Simmons, 
2000a,b). It might be that depleted consumers are more inclined to play because they 
perceive the jackpot prize as more attractive or because they become less repelled by 
the small chance of winning the jackpot prize. Depleted consumers might also be less 
bothered by the price (Vohs & Faber, in press).  
          Third, the results of Study 4 provided some preliminary evidence that people can 
use different mood regulation techniques that possibly differ in terms of their extent of  
self-control resource consumption, and hence in their consequences on consumer 
behavior.  It would be insightful for consumers to be aware of the depletion efficiency 
of the different mood regulation techniques that they use.  Future research is needed to 
clarify which mood regulation techniques are most appropriate in different 
circumstances for different people. 
           Fourth, even though we only established a link between a reduced exposure to 
sunshine and lottery play, the underlying model strongly suggests that the effects of 
sunshine may be generalizable to problem gambling and addictive behaviors in general. 
The underlying model even suggests that the effects may also be applicable to a wide 
range of “more regular” consumer behaviors as well. In fact, recent research already 
provided some evidence that depleted consumers display impulsive spending behavior 
more often (Vohs & Faber, in press). We call for future research that investigates the 
link between sunshine or other antecedents of self-control depletion and a broad range 
of consumer behaviors, such as promotional sensitivity and variety seeking.    71  
                   This brings us to a fifth area of future research, which could be to broaden our 
knowledge on other sorts of antecedents of self-control depletion.  The antecedents of 
depletion we focused on in the present research were reduced exposure to sunshine, and 
the resulting negative mood states. However, one could also consider the influence of 
other climatic conditions, such as extreme cold or heat, or the extent of rainfall (see 
Agnew & Palutikof, 1999; Keller et al., 2005). In addition to (collective) mood 
regulation due to climatic conditions, also response inhibition has been identified as a 
potential resource depleting factor (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002).  Response inhibition 
may occur when consumers postpone purchases, for example, because of expected 
changes in one’s economic conditions (Deleersnyder, Dekimpe, Sarvary, & Parker, 
2004). Postponement of desired purchases is likely to be depleting for some consumers, 
and hence could lead to an overall reduction in their ability to resist temptations of 
various kinds.   
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MANUSCRIPT III 
 






Self-control theories have focused on various aspects of the processes involved 
in exerting self-control. In the present paper, we intend to add to this literature by 
demonstrating that exerting self-control leads one to narrow one’s attention and 
cognition, inducing a narrow mindset. We demonstrate this in three studies. Participants 
who exerted self-control applied a narrower view (Study 1), applied a narrower 
categorization (Study 2), and used more concrete language (Study 3) than participants 
who did not exert self-control. Results are discussed in light of the possibility that a 
narrow mindset enhances performance on the self-control task at hand at the cost of 
poorer performance on other tasks.  
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The capacity to exert self-control is an important feature of human nature.  Self-
control refers to the self’s capacity to alter its own responses.  In general, people are 
able to regulate their thoughts, control their emotions, alter their performance or inhibit 
their impulses (e.g., Vohs & Baumeister, 2004b). Self-control theories have focused on 
various aspects of the processes involved in exerting self-control. Amongst other 
conceptualizations, researchers have stressed the importance of balancing ‘hot’ and 
‘cool’ cognitions (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), short-term and long-term considerations 
(Wertenbroch, 1998), low-level and high-level construals (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & 
Levin-Sagi, in press), or visceral responses and rational self-interest (Loewenstein, 
1996) in the processes involved in self-control. Yet others have focused on the 
energetic nature of self-control (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998), the 
distinction between automatic versus controlled psychological processes (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 1999), and the role of perceptions of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1991) in 
exerting self-control. In the present paper, we intend to add to this literature by focusing 
on yet another aspect of the processes involved in self-control. More specifically, we 
argue that exerting self-control leads one to narrow one’s attention and cognition, 
inducing a narrow mindset.  
 
Challenging Tasks and Narrowing of Attention and Cognition 
 
Earlier, it has been argued that narrowing one’s attention and cognition is 
associated with more successful performance on challenging tasks, particularly in the 
initial stages of learning (e.g., Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996; Norman & Shallice, 
1986; Scheier & Carver, 1988; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Vallacher, Wegner, & 
Somoza, 1989). Experientially, a number of different sorts of tasks such as those   75  
involving planning, decision-making, and components of troubleshooting, those being 
ill-learned or containing novel sequences of actions, those being judged to be 
technically difficult, those requiring the overcoming of a strong habitual or emotional 
response, and those requiring resisting temptation, necessitate deliberate attentional 
resources (Norman & Shallice, 1986). In the delay of gratification paradigm for 
instance, suppression of attention to the rewards facilitates successful delay behavior 
(Mischel et al., 1996). According to action identification theory, encoding difficult 
activities using low levels of abstraction and thus focusing attention towards task 
details enhances performance on the difficult task at hand (Vallacher et al., 1989; 
Vallacher & Wegner, 1987).  
Task circumstances that are highly similar to the ones just mentioned have been 
identified as involving a lot of self-control (e.g., Vohs & Baumeister, 2004a).  Hence, 
we propose that self-control tasks will also lead to narrowing of attention and cognition. 
More specifically, we claim that the exertion of self-control will even induce a narrow 
mindset, in that the state of narrowed attention and cognition lingers and influences 
how people deal with subsequent tasks. 
 
Broad and Narrow Mindsets, and the Link with Self-Control 
 
We propose a distinction between broad and narrow mindsets. Previously, 
mindsets have been defined as a heightened accessibility of cognitive operations 
(Gollwitzer, 1990a), whereby recently used cognitive operations are assumed to have 
temporarily higher activation levels, thus increasing their likelihood of being used to 
interpret new information (cf. Higgins, 1996) or steering behavior (Gollwitzer & Bayer, 
1999). Gollwitzer and colleagues (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1990a; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999)   76  
distinguished deliberative (i.e., considering potential pros and cons of particular courses 
of actions) and implemental mindsets (i.e., planning how to carry out activities). 
Besides differences in cognitive tuning and biased inferences, people in deliberative 
mindsets have also been found to differ from people in implemental mindsets in 
openness to information (Fujita, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, in press). Freitas, Gollwitzer, 
and Trope (2004) discriminated between abstract (i.e., construing actions at high levels 
of abstraction, specifying why they are performed) and concrete mindsets (i.e., 
construing actions at low levels of abstraction, specifying how they are performed), 
thus drawing on both action identification theory (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; 
Vallacher et al., 1989) and construal theory (Fujita, Trope, et al., in press; Trope & 
Liberman, 2000).  
We propose that exertion of self-control and the broadness of one’s mindset are 
linked. Most of the conceptualizations above have been linked to self-control issues 
before. What they basically have in common is that they assume importance of 
balancing abstract, long-term aims with concrete, immediate experiences in self-control 
issues. In fact, there is a lot of literature stating that balancing long-term, abstract aims 
and immediate, concrete experiences constitutes the essence of self-control (e.g., 
Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; Rachlin, 2000; Trope & Fishbach, 2000). We 
want to look at the link between broadness of mindset and self-control from another 
angle, however. Rather than assuming that people need a certain mindset in order to 
exert self-control, we propose that the act of exerting self-control induces a certain 
mindset in people. As indicated before, as successful performance on tasks that have 
important features in common with typical self-control tasks (e.g., Vohs & Baumeister, 
2004a) has been found to rely on narrowing of attention and cognition (e.g., Mischel et 
al., 1996; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Scheier & Carver, 1988; Vallacher et al., 1989;   77  
Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), we propose that the exertion of self-control will also rely 
on narrowing of attention and cognition, and will even induce a narrow mindset.  
 
The Present Studies 
 
It has been shown that the tendency to construe situations in a certain way can 
be activated by using similar construals in unrelated prior contexts (e.g., Förster, 
Friedman, & Lieberman, 2004) or can be induced directly through manipulations that 
activate cognitive procedures associated with each respective construal (Freitas et al., 
2004). Hence, if we are right in assuming that the exertion of self-control induces a 
narrow mindset, we should be able to observe carry-over effects of self-control 
manipulations on broadness of one’s attention and cognition for subsequent ostensibly 
unrelated tasks. 
In three experiments, we manipulated self-control and assessed the broadness of 
participants’ mindset. We chose a “legal brief” approach in which we attempted to 
summon evidence for our hypothesis using a package of disparate experiments (cf. 
Baumeister et al., 1998). If exerting self-control induces a narrow mindset, participants 
who have exerted self-control should adopt a narrow view (Study 1), apply narrow 
categorization (Study 2), and use concrete language (Study 3). We used various self-
control tasks and various measures of broadness of mindset as a first step towards 
generalization. Both the self-control tasks (e.g., Kuhl & Kazen, 1999; Muraven & 
Slessareva, 2003; Wallace & Baumeister, 2002; Wegner, Ansfield, & Pilloff, 1998) and 
the measures of broadness of mindset (Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999; Liberman, 
Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; Semin, Higgins, Gil de Montes, Estourget, & Valencia, 




In Study 1, participants engaged in a task that either required self-control or not. 
Subsequently, participants watched a series of slides that displayed centrally and 
peripherally presented information, and performed an unexpected recognition test 
containing the information presented (Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999). If exerting self-
control induces a narrow mindset, participants who have exerted self-control should 
correctly recognize fewer peripherally but more centrally presented words than 
participants who have not exerted self-control. 
 
Method 
Participants were 65 undergraduate students (45 women). They received a 
participation fee.  
     Participants were asked to engage in a thought-listing task for five minutes. They 
were instructed to write down their thoughts and either to avoid thinking about a white 
bear (self-control condition) or to think about anything they wanted, including a white 
bear (no self-control condition). When thinking of a white bear in the self-control 
condition, participants had to immediately change their thoughts and try very hard not to 
think of a white bear again. A similar task proved to be a successful self-control 
manipulation in earlier research (e.g., Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). 
     Subsequently, they watched a series of slides centrally displaying meaningful 
sentences and peripherally (i.e., in the upper left-hand and lower right-hand corners) 
displaying unrelated nouns. Participants were instructed to make a story out of the 
centrally displayed sentences. No mention of the peripherally presented nouns was made   79  
prior to the task. Later, participants performed an unexpected recognition test containing 
10 centrally presented nouns (i.e., nouns appearing in the centrally displayed sentences), 
10 peripherally presented nouns, and 10 previously not presented nouns. A similar task 
provided a successful measure of broadness of focus in earlier research (e.g., Gollwitzer 
& Bayer, 1999).  
          Participants’ mood was assessed by means of the Positive Affect Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This was done to validate 
that mood states were not different depending on self-control condition, thus ruling out a 
possible alternative account for our findings. Indeed, negative mood states have been 
shown to be associated with more systematic processing (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & 
Strack, 1990), and hence might influence the broadness of one’s mindset. 
 
Results 
We counted the number of nouns that were recognized correctly. Two 
participants who did not follow instructions were removed from further analyses. As 
predicted, participants who had exerted self-control recognized fewer peripherally 
presented nouns correctly (M = 3.21, SD = 2.26) than participants who had not exerted 
self-control (M = 4.50, SD = 2.25), t (61) = -2.27, p = .03, but participants who had 
exerted self-control recognized more centrally presented nouns correctly (M = 6.97, SD 
= 2.04) than participants who had not exerted self-control (M = 5.26, SD = 2.79), t (61) 
= 2.72, p = .01. This suggests that exerting self-control induces a narrow mindset. No 
differences between self-control conditions were observed for previously not presented 
nouns (self-control: M = 9.34, SD = 0.97; no self-control: M = 9.35, SD = 0.92; t (61) = 
-0.03, p = .97).   80  
The effect of self-control on narrowness of focus cannot be explained by mood 
differences. Levels of positive (self-control: M = 26.83, SD = 5.61; no self-control: M = 
27.91, SD = 5.69; t (61) = -0.76, p = .45) and negative affect (self-control: M = 16.00, 
SD = 5.97; no self-control: M = 15.76, SD = 4.66; t (61) = 0.18, p = .86) did not differ 
between self-control conditions. Moreover, adjusting for positive and negative affect as 
covariates did not change the pattern of results reported above, suggesting that mood 




In Study 2, participants engaged in a task that either required self-control or not. 
Subsequently, participants imagined themselves in one of three situations (e.g., having 
a yard sale) and classified objects related to each situation (e.g., books, cutlery) in as 
many categories as they deemed suitable (Liberman et al., 2002). Forming fewer groups 
means applying broader, more abstract categorization, whereas forming more groups 
means applying narrower, more concrete categorization. If exerting self-control induces 
a narrow mindset, participants who have exerted self-control should form more groups 
than participants who have not exerted self-control. 
 
Method 
Participants were 63 undergraduate students (47 women). They received a 
participation fee.  
Participants were asked to engage in the same thought-listing task as in Study 1. 
Subsequently, participants imagined that they were going on a camping trip, that they 
were going to be moving into a new apartment, or that they were going to have a yard   81  
sale. Each scenario came with 38 objects that participants had to place into groups (e.g., 
tent and matches in the camping scenario, VCR and computer in the moving out 
scenario, and roller blades and board games in the yard sale scenario). This task is one 
of the standard measures of broadness of categorization (e.g., Liberman et al., 2002).  
Participants’ mood was assessed by means of the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988). 




We counted the number of groups into which participants classified the objects 
of each scenario. We collapsed over scenarios. As predicted, participants who had 
exerted self-control formed more groups (M = 6.82, SD = 1.70) than participants who 
had not exerted self-control (M = 6.00, SD = 1.41), t (61) = 2.06, p = .04. This suggests 
that exerting self-control induces a narrow mindset. 
The effect of self-control on narrowness of categorization cannot be explained 
by mood differences. Levels of positive (self-control: M = 24.29, SD = 5.46; no self-
control: M = 26.40, SD = 6.78; t (59) = -1.34, p = .19) and negative affect (self-control: 
M = 14.61, SD = 6.24; no self-control: M = 13.90, SD = 5.03; t (59) = 0.49, p = .63) did 
not differ between self-control conditions. Moreover, adjusting for positive and 
negative affect as covariates did not change the pattern of results reported above, 
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Study 3 
 
In Study 3, participants engaged in a task that either required self-control or not. 
We used a different self-control task for reasons of generalization. Subsequently, 
participants watched a series of five cartoons and described what they saw in writing, 
using one single word for each cartoon. Words were analyzed for abstractness of 
language, using coding schemes developed for the Linguistic Categorization Model 
(Semin & Fiedler, 1998). Broader, more abstract ways of thinking should be revealed 
through the use of more abstract language, whereas narrower, more concrete ways of 
thinking should be revealed through the use of more concrete language. If exerting self-
control induces a narrow mindset, participants who have exerted self-control should use 
more concrete language than participants who have not exerted self-control. 
 
Method 
Participants were 106 undergraduate students (86 women). They received a 
participation fee. 
Participants were asked to engage in a variation of the Stroop task and to indicate 
the ink color of 50 color names. Words and ink colors were either matched (e.g., RED in 
red ink; no self-control condition) or mismatched (e.g., RED in yellow ink; self-control 
condition). In addition, in the self-control condition, in case a word in blue ink appeared 
(i.e., in 25% of the trials), participants were instructed to indicate the word rather than 
the ink color. A similar task proved to be a successful self-control manipulation in 
earlier research (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). 
Subsequently, participants watched a series of five cartoons and described the 
behavior of each cartoon’s main character using one single word. Two judges blind to   83  
condition coded participants’ written descriptions according to the Linguistic 
Categorization Model (Semin & Fiedler, 1988). According to this model, four linguistic 
categories (i.e., descriptive action verbs, interpretative action verbs, state verbs, and 
adjectives) can be organized along a dimension of concreteness to abstractness, with 
descriptive action verbs being the least, and adjectives being the most abstract. 
Typically, a weighting schema is applied to weigh descriptive action verbs (1), 
interpretative action verbs (2), state verbs (3), and adjectives (4) (Semin & Smith, 1999). 
Words describing the cartoon rather than its main character’s actions (i.e., 4 % of the 
words) were omitted from the analysis. To control for these missing values, weighted 
scores were divided by the number of coded predicates for each participant. The 
resulting abstractness index scores (ranging from 1 to 4) calculated from each judge’s 
ratings were highly correlated, r = .94, p < .0001. Discrepancies in codes were resolved 
through discussion to form a single index. This task is one of the standard measures of 
linguistic abstraction (e.g., Semin et al., 2005).  
Participants’ mood was assessed by means of the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988). 




We averaged the standardized abstractness index scores across cartoons. Codes 
were standardized to control for the fact that some cartoons were perceived to be more 
abstract than others. As predicted, participants who had exerted self-control used more 
concrete language (M = -0.08, SD = 0.60) than participants who had not exerted self-
control (M = 0.20, SD = 0.78), t (104) = -2.06, p = .04. This suggests that exerting self-
control induces a narrow mindset.   84  
The effect of self-control on linguistic abstraction cannot be explained by mood 
differences. Levels of positive (self-control: M = 29.30, SD = 6.15; no self-control: M = 
28.46, SD = 4.31; t (104) = 0.81, p = .42) and negative affect (self-control: M = 13.02, 
SD = 3.73; no self-control: M = 12.96, SD = 3.45; t (104) = 0.08, p = .94) did not differ 
between self-control conditions. Moreover, adjusting for positive and negative affect as 
covariates did not change the pattern of results reported above, suggesting that mood 




       In three experiments, we tested the hypothesis that exerting self-control induces 
a narrow mindset. Participants who exerted self-control by suppressing their thoughts 
applied a narrower view (Study 1) and narrower categorization (Study 2) than 
participants who did not suppress their thoughts and hence did not exert self-control. In 
Study 3, participants who exerted self-control by inhibiting their dominant responses 
during a taxing Stroop task used more concrete language than participants who did not 
inhibit their dominant responses during an easy Stroop task and hence did not exert 
self-control. In a meta-analysis on our findings, we calculated a difference score for the 
two dependent variables of interest in Study 1, and reversed scores such that lower 
values indicated a narrower mindset for all dependent measures. Next, we standardized 
our dependent measures and aggregated the findings across all three studies (N = 232). 
Participants who exerted self-control provided evidence of a narrower mindset (M = -
0.26, SD = 0.91) than participants who did not exert self-control (M = 0.26, SD = 1.01), 
t (230) = 4.12, p < .0001. These findings suggest that a narrow mindset is a   85  
consequence of engaging in self-control that consistently occurs after various instances 
of self-control. 
In the present paper, we proposed a distinction between broad and narrow 
mindsets. Similar differentiations have emerged in previous literature. Examples are 
concepts such as high level and low level action identifications (Vallacher & Wegner, 
1987), high level and low level construals (Trope & Liberman, 2000), simultaneous and 
sequential decision making (Simonson, 1990), distributed and isolated decision making 
(Herrnstein & Prelec, 1992), broad and narrow decision frames (Kahneman & Lovallo, 
1993), decision making based on patterns and acts (Rachlin, 1995), overall and local 
value functions (Heyman, 1996), and broad and narrow bracketing (Read, Loewenstein, 
& Rabin 1999). Broad bracketing (i.e., like high level action identifications, high 
construals, simultaneous decision making, distributed decision making, broad decision 
framing, pattern-based decision making, considering overall value functions) allows 
people to take into account all the consequences of their actions, whereas narrow 
bracketing (i.e., like low level action identifications, low construals, sequential decision 
making, isolated decision making, narrow decision framing, act-based decision making, 
and considering local value functions) induces people to make each decision in 
isolation (Read et al., 1999).  
We sought to provide a unified account of these constructs by advancing a 
distinction between broad and narrow mindsets. We preferred to use the term mindset 
over the terms bracketing or construal, because, similar to the term mindset as used by 
Gollwitzer (1990a), the state that we describe lingers and influences how people deal 
with subsequent tasks. Simultaneously, the term mindset is associated with temporality 
and, like other momentarily activated cognitive material, can be expected to dissolve 
gradually over time (e.g., Higgins, 1996). We preferred to use the term mindset over the   86  
terms action identification level, decision making, or value function because the term 
mindset does not only reflect action perception, decision making, or utility calculations, 
but has implications for all of these constructs. Likewise, we preferred to use the terms 
broad and narrow over some of the other adjectives mentioned, because, similar to the 
adjectives broad and narrow as used by Read et al. (1999), the state that we describe 
induces general changes in one’s breadth of attention, shifting people’s attention from 
the macro level to the micro level, or the other way around.  
       We found that a narrow mindset consistently occurs after various instances of 
self-control. These results might have implications for research about another 
consequence of exerting self-control, namely, self-control depletion. It has been argued 
that all acts of self-control draw on a common limited resource that is akin to energy or 
strength. Hence, exertion of self-control is necessarily followed by a period of 
diminished capacity to exert subsequent self-control (i.e., depletion). Eventually, with 
sufficient rest, the resource should build up again (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven, 
Tice, & Baumeister, 1998). Given the present findings, it might very well be that 
narrow mindsets and self-control depletion are related phenomena. Although narrowing 
one’s focus down to concrete task characteristics appears to be functional to adequately 
perform the self-control task at hand (Vallacher et al., 1989), it might not be functional 
to adequately perform a subsequent self-control task that requires a different focus. The 
narrow mindset that is induced as a way to deal with the first task does not vanish 
immediately, rendering the participant relatively unable to deal successfully with the 
second task. According to Gollwitzer (1990a), the transfer of cognitive procedures from 
one task to an unrelated task is the hallmark of mindset priming. The traditional self-
control depletion effect then (i.e., people do not perform well on self-control tasks after 
having exerted self-control previously) might result from the detrimental effects of the   87  
prolonged mindset induced by the first self-control task on the second self-control task. 
This line of reasoning nevertheless implies that the narrow mindset resulting from 
exerting self-control is content-specific to some extent, which is a fundamental 
assumption that remains to be investigated.  
Ironically, the above line of reasoning would mean that a narrow mindset might 
sometimes be beneficial, and sometimes be detrimental for successful self-control, the 
latter assertion being consistent with recent literature (Fujita, Trope, et al., in press). 
Fujita, Trope, et al. (in press) manipulated construal levels and assessed self-control 
subsequently. They showed that high level construals, in comparison to low level 
construals, increased self-control. We proceeded the other way around, in that we 
manipulated self-control exertion and assessed the broadness of one’s mindset 
subsequently. Seemingly contradictory to Fujita, Trope, et al. (in press), we observed 
that having exerted self-control, in comparison to not having exerted self-control, 
induced a more narrow mindset. These combined findings again hint at how mindsets 
might provide an explanation for the typical depletion effect. Although previous 
induction of a broad way of thinking is beneficial for self-control later on (Fujita, 
Trope, et al., in press), the very act of exerting self-control induces one to narrow one’s 
attention and cognition, making subsequent self-control more difficult. More research is 
needed however to clarify the exact nature of the moderating factor that determines 
when a narrow mindset is beneficial or detrimental for self-control.    88    89  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
     In this general discussion, we start by summarizing the main findings and the 
theoretical contributions of the three presented manuscripts. In doing so, we hope to 
further clarify the link between the three manuscripts. We move on to identifying some 




     The purpose of the present dissertation was twofold. First, we wanted to obtain 
more insight in the processes underlying self-control and self-control depletion. 
Second, we wanted to explore the applicability of self-control and self-control depletion 
to the consumer domain. Taking the three manuscripts together, we attempt to show 
how we reached this double purpose.  
 
Manuscript I   
         In  Manuscript  I,  we  found  that  one of the most frequent activities during a 
shopping trip (i.e., choosing) increases consumers’ susceptibility to affective product 
features while purchasing products. In three studies, we observed that when people 
made a series of active product choices they are more likely to buy an attractive but 
relatively expensive product (Study 1), and to buy more items of a very attractive type 
of candy (Studies 2 and 3) as compared to when they merely have followed a pre-
established shopping plan.  
             Our  main  theoretical  contribution consists of providing evidence that in a 
shopping context, both active choice-making and resisting the temptation of affective   90  
product features require self-control. Hence, we not only succeed in providing more 
insight in the processes underlying self-control and self-control depletion, but we also 
demonstrate how both concepts can be crucial to understanding consumer behavior.  
 
Manuscript II 
     In  Manuscript  II,  we  found  that  a shortage of sunshine increases people’s 
willingness to engage in lottery play. We showed that active mood regulation attempts 
that accompany bad weather and that are depleting in nature result in a decreased 
resistance to the temptation of lottery play. In a longitudinal study on real-life lottery 
expenditure data, we found that a reduced exposure to sunshine in the days preceding 
the lottery draw resulted in higher lottery revenues, even after controlling for various 
other factors that have been identified as important drivers of lottery play. In three 
subsequent studies, we observed that lottery play is related to negative mood when 
people are given the opportunity to actively regulate this negative mood (Study 2), and 
that depletion due to active mood regulation attempts is the process underlying the link 
between bad mood due to weather and lottery play (Studies 3 and 4).  
     Our use of a combined modeling and experimental approach allows us not only 
to establish causal relations between our variables of interest, but also to enhance the 
external validity of our results. Our findings point out that both active mood regulation 
and resisting the temptation of lottery play require self-control. In addition, our results 
indicate that previous literature suggesting that consumers in bad mood states are 
motivated to repair their bad mood states, and hence unwilling to resist temptations 
(Baumeister, 2002; Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Herman & Polivy, 2004; 
Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001), should be re-examined in the light of the 
depletion hypothesis proposing that consumers in bad mood states may be unable to   91  
resist temptations. Hence, again we not only succeed in providing more insight in the 
processes underlying self-control and self-control depletion, but we also demonstrate 
how both concepts can be crucial to understanding consumer behavior. 
      
Manuscript III 
       In Manuscript III, we found that exerting self-control induces a narrow mindset. 
Participants who exerted self-control applied a narrower view (Study 1), a narrower 
categorization (Study 2), and used more concrete language (Study 3) than participants 
who did not exert self-control.  
     Our main theoretical contribution consists of providing evidence that a narrow 
mindset is a consequence of engaging in self-control that consistently occurs after 
various instances of self-control. Hence, we succeed in providing more insight in the 
processes underlying self-control. We hope to link narrow mindsets to self-control 
depletion in follow-up research, and thus provide more insight in the processes 
underlying self-control depletion as well. In a related stream of follow-up research, we 
aim to demonstrate how this alternative understanding of self-control depletion may be 




          We identified some interesting routes for future research in the discussion 
sections of Manuscripts I and II. As indicated before, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether a state of depletion would also influence consumer decisions with 
respect to major durables, and whether the depletion effect would also be observed for 
other types of affective products cues than the ones studied (Manuscript I). In addition,   92  
it would be appealing to find out to what extent various types of mood regulation are 
depleting and hence, will increase lottery play, to which other consumer behaviors 
besides lottery play the depletion effect would generalize, and which other antecedents 
of self-control depletion besides a shortage of sunlight might be relevant in a consumer 
behavior context (Manuscript II).  
     Interestingly, the findings obtained in Manuscript I enable us to answer some of 
the questions raised by the findings of Manuscript II, whereas the findings obtained in 
Manuscript II enable us to answer some of the questions raised by the findings of 
Manuscript I. For instance, it has become clear that the depletion effect also occurs for 
other types of affective product cues besides taste, such as the tempting nature of lottery 
play, the thrill of playing, or the promise of the reward. In addition, we observed that 
besides a shortage of sunlight, repeated choice-making is another antecedent of self-
control depletion that is relevant in a consumer behavior context. A lot of questions still 
remain unanswered, however.  
     We believe that the mindset hypothesis that was presented in Manuscript III has 
important implications for our understanding of the depletion phenomenon and can 
provide a new explanation for the findings of Manuscript I and II. We also believe that 
the mindset hypothesis has several practical marketing implications. We sketch these 
theoretical and practical implications in the next sections.  
 
Theoretical implications of the mindset hypothesis 
       In the discussion section of Manuscript III, we touched upon the possibility that 
narrow mindsets and self-control depletion (i.e., a diminished capacity to exert self-
control) might be closely related. Indeed, both states result from previous exertion of 
self-control. We speculated that the lingering narrow mindset that one adopts during   93  
engagement in a self-control task (i.e., because it is functional to adequately perform 
the self-control task, see Vallacher, Wegner, & Somoza, 1989) may be problematic if 
one wants to engage in a second self-control task requiring a different focus, as is 
usually the case in typical depletion studies. In general, people are found to not perform 
well on self-control tasks after having previously engaged in unrelated self-control 
tasks. Through future research, we hope to accumulate a body of evidence 
demonstrating that depletion effects occur because people are ‘stuck’ in this narrow 
mindset that was induced by a first episode of exerting self-control but that is 
dysfunctional to adequately perform a second, conceptually unrelated, self-control task. 
In other words, we will argue that depletion is being stuck in an inadequate narrow 
mindset. 
       As it turns out, others already pointed out that self-control failure may partly 
occur because of difficulties in organizing and reorganizing cognitive resources 
(Murtagh & Todd, 2004). More specifically, it has been argued that depletion effects 
may be observed because people have difficulties switching from one type of task to 
another. Some people might be better than others at organizing their behavior to make 
these transitions and most people will gain skill in coordinating cognitive resources and 
behaviors in familiar contexts, and thus enhance their ability to “multi-task”. In 
experimental settings however, people may have a hard time adjusting to the novel 
context and its demands. This may be particularly true for typical depletion studies, in 
which people have to excel in two unrelated and relatively novel tasks (e.g., thought 
control and physical endurance). These task requirements may make it extremely 
difficult for people to organize their resources in such a way as to allow them to easily 
cope with the task demands.    94  
     Likewise, Fishbach, Friedman, and Kruglanski (2003) contended that successful 
self-control will only be accomplished if one keeps one’s goals firmly in focus. Hence, 
repeated self-control attempts in a given domain may result in the forging of facilitative 
links between certain stimuli and their high priority goals, and the forging of inhibitory 
links between these stimuli and the pertinent temptations that threaten to undermine 
these high priority goals. Over time or after sufficient practice, these facilitative and 
inhibitory links may become overlearned to the point of unconscious activation and 
considerable cognitive efficiency and may be related to successful self-control. Bargh 
(1994) also advocated that processes that are frequently engaged in become 
automatized, resulting in increased efficiency. 
       In line with these conjectures, we already obtained some evidence showing that 
typical depletion effects after the exertion of self-control do not occur if the response 
conflict in the second phase is similar to the one in the first phase. For instance, we 
found that, as people engage longer in a given self-control task, they become 
increasingly better at fulfilling the task requirements of thought inhibition and response 
accuracy. We also found that engagement in a typically depleting thought suppression 
task decreased performance in a subsequent task requiring monitoring of multiple rules 
and frequent altering of one’s responses (i.e., replicating the typical self-control 
depletion effect), but that engagement in a typically depleting task requiring monitoring 
of multiple rules and frequent altering of one’s responses enhanced performance in a 
subsequent similar task (i.e., reversing the typical self-control depletion effect). In 
addition, people who inhibited their eating behavior in phase one performed worse on a 
subsequent self-control task that was unrelated to food restriction (i.e., replicating the 
typical self-control depletion effect), but performed better on a subsequent self-control 
task that was related to food restriction (i.e., reversing the typical self-control depletion   95  
effect). These findings can be accounted for by a mindset explanation: People 
concentrate on concrete task characteristics, enabling them to do well on a given self-
control task, but making it more difficult for them to do well on an unrelated self-
control task.  
     Interestingly,  in  a  related  research project we obtained some preliminary 
evidence suggesting that the beneficial effects of previous exertion of self-control need 
not be restricted to subsequent self-control tasks that share response conflicts. More 
specifically, we found that depletion effects that are typically observed between cross-
tasks can disappear if people are able to abandon the narrow mindset they adopted 
during the first task, before they engage in the second task. People who exerted self-
control and were experimentally induced to broaden the mindset they adopted, 
performed better on a second, unrelated self-control task, thus suppressing the typical 
depletion effects.  
     Our concept of narrow mindset resembles a highly appealing concept that has 
been put forward in the depletion literature earlier, namely, the concept of extended-
now state (Vohs & Schmeichel, 2003). Vohs and Schmeichel (2003) demonstrated that 
self-control and the subjective experience of time are closely related. More specifically, 
they showed that people who exerted self-control experienced time as moving forward 
much more slowly than people who did not exert self-control. They also showed that 
subjective time perception mediated the depletion effect. People believed that their self-
control attempts lasted longer than they actually did, which resulted in reduced further 
self-control. Vohs and Schmeichel (2003) proposed that “elongated perceptions of time 
may render one ‘stuck’ in the present, a state that has negative consequences for future-
oriented behavior” (p. 219). They called this state an extended-now state. Like the 
extended-now state, a narrow mindset results from exerting self-control and people can   96  
be temporarily ‘stuck’ in it (i.e., resulting in carry-over effects on subsequent tasks). 
Both concepts might however enable us to make diverging predictions in certain 
circumstances. Future research is needed to clarify how similar or diverging the two 
concepts really are. 
 
Marketing implications of the mindset hypothesis 
          Mindsets, affective product features, and lottery play. We believe that the 
mindset theory that was proposed in Manuscript III can account for several consumer 
behavior phenomena, including the phenomena observed in Manuscripts I and II. In 
fact, related mindset theories have been used to explain consumer behavior phenomena 
before. Examples are the concept of choice bracketing (Read, Loewenstein, & Rabin, 
1999), Gollwitzer’s theory of deliberative and implemental mindsets (Gollwitzer, 
1990b; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999), and Trope’s construal theory (Trope & Liberman, 
2000; Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, in press).  
     According to Read et al. (1999), when making many choices, people can broadly 
bracket them by assessing the consequences of all of them taken together, or narrowly 
bracket them by making each choice in isolation. Broad bracketing allows people to 
take into account all the consequences of their actions and generally leads to choices 
that yield higher utility. Narrow bracketing in contrast leaves people without overall 
guiding strategy, leading to non-optimal consequences. Indeed, the consequences of 
choices can rarely be fully appreciated in isolation.  
     Narrow  bracketing  has  a  lot  in  common with the narrow mindset that was 
proposed in Manuscript III. For one thing, narrow bracketing, like adopting a narrow 
mindset, generally shifts people’s attention from the macro level to the micro level. In 
addition, as is the case with mindsets, many bracketing choices result from a wide   97  
range of subtle and unconscious factors that influence how broadly or narrowly we 
construe the world. Interestingly, the authors identify cognitive capacity limitations as 
one important factor that might be important in influencing bracketing decisions. 
Cognitive capacity limitations sharply constrain our ability to simultaneously consider 
multiple decisions, and thus will favor narrow bracketing (Read et al., 1999).  
     Bracketing effects (i.e., mindset effects) occur whenever the outcomes chosen 
under narrow bracketing differ from those chosen under broad bracketing. This can 
result from the fact that broad bracketing facilitates the consideration of choice factors 
that are either not perceived or that are given relatively less weight in narrow 
bracketing. Adding-up effects (i.e., when perceived costs of alternatives accumulate at a 
different rate than their benefits) are representative examples. Consider for instance the 
health consequences of one cigarette or the extra weight added by one piece of cake. If 
consumers bracket narrowly and consider the costs and benefits of a single action, then 
the balance of costs and benefits will likely favor the benefits, whereas if they bracket 
broadly the balance can be reversed. Another interesting consequence of narrow 
bracketing is the so-called peanuts effect, in which repeated and seemingly 
inconsequential purchases of trivial items can add up to significant total expenditures 
(Read et al., 1999).  
     Even seemingly trivial decisions such as whether or not to purchase an attractive 
but slightly overpriced product (Manuscript I) or a lottery ticket (Manuscript II) can 
have detrimental cumulative effects. When people make narrowly bracketed choices, 
they can make a series of local choices that individually seem advantageous but that 
collectively lead to a bad global outcome (Read et al., 1999). Thus, mindset theories 
appear to be able to account for the findings obtained in Manuscripts I and II. 
Consumers who exert self-control by either making repeated product choices   98  
(Manuscript I) or actively regulating their negative mood states (Manuscript II) will 
adopt a narrow mindset in order to fulfill the task requirements (Manuscript III). This 
resulting narrow mindset however, subsequently induces consumers to fail to take into 
account the broader consequences of there actions, and thus to purchase trivial items 
(Read et al., 1999). 
     Mindsets and other consumer behaviors. As indicated earlier, mindset theories 
have been used to explain several consumer behavior phenomena. For instance, 
Gollwitzer’s (1990b; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999) theory of deliberative and implemental 
mindsets has been put forward as a possible explanation for the shopping momentum 
effect (Dhar, Huber, & Khan, 2005). Shopping momentum occurs when an initial 
purchase provides a psychological impulse whose momentum drives the purchase of a 
second, unrelated product. The concept arises from the idea that shopping has an 
inertial quality, that there is a mental hurdle in the shift from browsing to shopping, 
which once crossed makes further purchases more likely. Shopping momentum is said 
to occur because an initial purchase will move one from deliberation-induced browsing 
to implementation-based shopping, thus driving subsequent purchases. Support for 
these assertions was found in five experiments (Dhar et al., 2005). Similar to our 
concept of broad mindset, deliberative mindsets are associated with enhanced 
receptivity to all sources and types of information in order to weigh the pros and cons 
of pursuing several actions. In addition, similar to our concept of narrow mindset, 
implemental mindsets are associated with more selective information processing in 
order to focus on goal-oriented actions (Fujita, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, in press).   
     Empirical evidence in support of a lot of related hypotheses about the link 
between mindsets and other consumer behaviors is still lacking and needed, however. 
For instance, construal levels have been argued to exert an influence on product   99  
choices. Consumers who construe objects on a high level (i.e., who construct abstract 
conceptualizations of information about objects and capture the superordinate, central 
features of the object) should prefer products with favorable central features over 
products with favorable secondary features, whereas consumers who construe objects 
on a low level (i.e., who construct concrete conceptualizations of information about 
objects and capture the subordinate, incidental features of the object) might prefer 
products with favorable secondary features over products with favorable central 
features (Trope & Liberman, 2000).  
     Likewise,  narrow  bracketing  has  been argued to lead to time-inconsistent 
preferences because it induces one to fail to recognize how a choice of one alternative 
will influence one’s desire for future alternatives, leading to addiction for instance. 
Bracketing might also have an effect on the scheduling of future experiences. People 
like to have their pleasures and pains distributed over time in specific ways (e.g., 
Nelson & Meyvis, 2005), and can only know which choices will help them to achieve 
these goals when they schedule many experiences simultaneously. Narrow bracketing 
has also been linked to a failure to make optimal trade-offs across choices, leading to 
too restrictive budgeting boundaries (i.e., a reluctance to transfer money from an 
account intended for one purchase category to an account intended for another purchase 
category) for instance. Bracketing has also been hypothesized to affect consumers’ 
degree of risk averseness. People like to avoid risk and one way to reduce risk is to 
combine many risky choices, which can only be achieved through broad bracketing. 
Finally, bracketing might have an influence on variety seeking because consumers 
often prefer sets of goods that are diverse rather than homogeneous. Consumers are 
more likely to pay attention to this diversity when they bracket multiple choices 
together (Read et al., 1999).    100  
     In line with the prediction that narrow bracketing will reduce variety seeking, 
Redden (2005) obtained evidence for a categorization mechanism underlying satiation 
(i.e., any decline in the pleasure of an experience that occurs with repetition). Satiation 
is argued to increase as a given stimulus recruits and aggregates similar episodes from 
the past. This implies that the categorization of experiences during perception will 
influence satiation, in that more specific categorization of experiences (e.g., eating pie) 
will reduce satiation by inhibiting the aggregation of past stimuli, whereas less specific 
categorization of experiences (e.g., having dessert) will increase satiation by facilitating 
the aggregation of past stimuli. Given that consumers have been found to respond to 
satiation by seeking variety (e.g., Inman, 2001; Kahn, Ratner, & Kahneman, 1997; 
Simonson, 1990), we can draw the prediction that the narrow mindset that we put 
forward as the underlying mechanism for depletion will lead to reduced satiation and 
thus reduced variety seeking. Indeed, in Manuscript III we found that narrow mindsets 
lead to applying narrower, more concrete categorization, or  forming more groups 
(Study 2).  
     Positive effects of self-control depletion. Although contrary to prevailing beliefs 
(Baumeister, 2002; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister et al., 1994), we think 
that self-control depletion can be beneficial sometimes. We already discussed some 
preliminary evidence showing that previous exertion of self-control can positively 
influence one’s performance on a second self-control task with a similar response 
conflict. There appears to be more, however. 
     There are some situations in which narrow bracketing results in superior decision 
making (Read et al., 1999). Although broad bracketing can serve motivational purposes 
and allow people to pursue maximization of their global well-being, narrow bracketing 
can make goals seem easier to attain sometimes. People sometimes adopt a particular   101  
narrow bracket to accomplish some goal, most typically to overcome problems of self-
control. For instance, many self-control programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous 
emphasize the importance of taking small steps towards the goal of recovery. Broad 
bracketing might make the task seem overwhelming. In addition, choices made under 
broad bracketing often involve putting up with small discomforts, annoyances or 
cognitive costs in order to achieve long-term gains. We need some way of comparing 
the overall utility of a lifetime of small annoyances and to balance cognitive costs 
against the big gains from broad bracketing (Read et al., 1999).  
     In  line  with  these  conceptualizations, there are some empirical findings 
documenting on the fact that preferences and judgments can become less accurate and 
predictive the longer one consciously deliberates about them (Wilson & Schooler, 
1991). Especially choices in complex matters (i.e., such as between different houses or 
different cars) should be left to unconscious thought (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & 
van Baaren, 2006). We encourage further research into these issues. 
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